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CASE NOTES
AGENCY-BORROWED SERVANT DOCTRINE-LIABILITY OF
GENERAL EMPLOYER TO SPECIAL EMPLOYER"BURDEN" OF PROOF
Defendant rented a bulldozer to plaintiff and provided one of his employees to
operate the machine. Plaintiff pointed out the work to be done but gave no instruction as to the manner of performance. Thereafter the operator negligently
damaged plaintiff's property, whereupon this action was commenced against
defendant, the general employer. On appeal from the trial court's judgment for
defendant (jury trial having been waived below), Held: Reversed. The burden
is upon the general employer to prove not only that he loaned the servant but
that he surrendered control and direction of the employee to the borrower. Miller
v. Woolsey, 35 N.W. 2d 584 (Iowa 1949).
In the numerous "borrowed servant" cases, various criteria have been employed to determine whether the original relation of master and servant has
been suspended and a new relation between the borrower and servant created.
The most popular test is whether the servant continues to be subject to the direction and control of the general employer, or whether he becomes subject to the
active supervision of the person to whom he is loaned. Standard Oil Company v.
Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 29 S. Ct. 252, 53 L. Ed. 480 (1909). The rules used to
determine who has control over the servant are "beset with distinctions so delicate that chaos is the consequence." Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L.
REv. 113, 121 (1921). It is not the actual exercise of the control, but the right
to exercise such control that is decisive. Ash v. Century Lumber Co., 153 Iowa
523, 133 N.W. 888, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 973 (1911). Generally, the control necessary
to constitute the borrower the master must be more than the mere right to point
out the work to be done. O'Brien v. Rindskopf, 334 Mo. 1233, 70 S.W. 2d 1085
(1934). The right of the general employer to discharge the servant or substitute
another for him indicates a continuation of the original employment. Wagner v.
Larson, 174 Wis. 26, 182 N.W. 336

(1921);

RESTATEMENT, AGENCY

§ 227,

comment c. Use by the borrowed servant of the general employer's machine
further evidences such a continuation. Stewart v. California Imp. Co., 131, Cal.
125, 63 Pac. 177, 52 A.L.R. 205 (1900). Cf. Lytle Co. v. Hansen & Rowland, 151
F. 2d 573 (C.C.A. 9th 1945). Another standard often applied is the so-called
"whose business?" test. This question is not necessarily conclusive since the servant's work may be in furtherance of the business of both employers. Gordon v.
Byers Motor Car Co., 309 Pa. 453, 164 Atl. 334 (1932). Most of the cases wherein
these control tests are applied arise on the complaint of an injured third party.
In those few reported instances where a special employer was the party plaintiff,
the same rules of determining liability of the general or special employer have
been utilized. Hilgenberg v. Elam, 145 Tex. 437, 198 S.W. 2d 94 (1946) ; Bibb
Mfg. Co. v. Souther, 52 Ga. App. 722, 184 S.E. 421 (1936).
It is ordinarily within the province of the jury to decide whether the alleged
servant was in fact an employee of the defendant. Banfield v. Whipple, 10 Allen
27, 87 Am. Dec. 618 (Mass. 1863). Whether the control of the operator has passed
to the special employer is also a jury question. Anderson v. Abramson, 234 Iowa
792, 13 N.W. 2d 315 (1944). Once it is shown that the servant is in the employ
of the general employer, the burden is on the latter to go forward with evidence
107
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to show that he surrendered control of the servant when he loaned him to the
special employer. Hooper v. Brawner, 148 Md. 417, 129 Atl. 672, 42 A.L.R. 1437
(1925) ; Anderson v. Abramson, supra. In the absence of such evidence, it will be
inferred that the general employer has retained control. See RESTATEMENT,
AGENCY § 227, comment b (1933).
The majority in the instant case felt that the general employer had failed to
present any evidence whatsoever to sustain the burden that was upon him of
going forward with evidence to rebut the inference that he had retained control
of the loaned servant. Four justices registered a dissent to this holding and contended that there should be no reversal since the evidence adduced in the trial
court was inconclusive of both the negligence of the operator and of the question
of control. In addition, confusion was unnecessarily created here by the dissenting
justices' apparent misinterpretation of the majority's use of the word "burden."
There was unanimity of opinion among the court that the well-recognized control tests hereinbefore enumerated were of valid application in this somewhat
rare instance where the special employer is the party plaintiff in an action
against the general employer for the tort of a borrowed servant. No actual disagreement as to principle is discernible.
FLOYD M. BUFORD.

AGENCY-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REFINING COMPANY
AND ITS DISTRIBUTORS AND RETAILERS
Defendant's contract with distributor, although expressly stating that distributor was to be an independent contractor, stipulated that title to the products
was to remain in defendant, carefully defined the territory in which distributor
was to operate, required distributor to furnish equipment and labor to handle
defendant's product, and imposed a duty on distributor to deposit in defendant's
bank account all cash from sales and to account strictly for all barrels returned
for credit by customers. The accident giving rise to this litigation arose when
defendant directed the distributor to move a 1200 pound tank belonging to defendant but located outside of distributor's territory as defined by the contract.
Distributor thereupon requested a trucking company to send a truck for the tank,
explaining that he would undertake the loading of the tank. The trucking company sent out a truck with the plaintiff (the driver) and two helpers. The distributor furnished two men to load the tank. The skids used to load it belonged
to the defendant. The plaintiff was injured by the breaking of one of the skids.
Plaintiff sued in federal court, jurisdiction being based upon diversity of citizenship. Defendant claimed, inter alia, that distributor was an independent contractor and that he was not liable for the torts of either the distributor or the
distributor's employees. On appeal from judgment for defendant, Held: Reversed.
Although the distributor is, under Georgia law, an independent contractor, defendant is liable nevertheless, because the act of moving the tank was not covered by the contract, and the distributor was a servant with respect to that
particular transaction. Helms v. Sinclair Refining Co., 170 F. 2d 289 (C.C.A.
5th 1948).
Refining companies have resorted to a variety of contractual instruments in
an attempt to control distributors and retailers of their products and at the same
time to escape liability for the torts of the distributors, retailers and their employees. These contracts may be termed "leases," Coffman v. Shell Petroleum
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Corp., 228 Mo. App. 727, 71 S.W. 2d 97 (1934), or "consignments." Gulf Refining Co. v. Han-is, 30 Ga. App. 240, 117 S.E. 274 (1923), aff'd, Harris v. Gulf
Refining Co., 157 Ga. 411, 121 S.E. 242 (1924). Sometimes they purport to create
an "independent contractor" relationship. Gulf Refining Co. v. Nations, 167 Miss.
315, 145 So. 327 (1933). Where the question has been raised, the cases are in
definite conflict as to whether a distributor is a servant for whose acts the refining company is liable, or is an independent contractor for whose acts the
refining company is not responsible.
Some jurisdictions give full effect to the express stipulations of the parties
and hold a distributor to be an independent contractor. Georgia falls into this
group. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Veal, 51 Ga. App. 755, 181 S.E. 705 (1935). Other
cases hold that where substantial evidence exists that the distributor was acting
as the agent or servant of the refining company at the time of the injury complained of, the jury shall decide the relationship. Standard Oil Co. v. Parkinson,
152 Fed. 681 (C.C.A. 8th 1907). Still other decisions reach a more desirable
result by holding that where a proper construction of the terms of the contract
by the court shows that the relationship is in fact one of principal and agent,
the declarations to the contrary have no significance. Gulf Refining Co. v. Brown,
93 F. 2d 870, 116 A.L.R. 449 (C.C.A. 4th 1938); Tate v. Claussen-Lawrence
Construction Co., 168 S.C. 481, 167 S.E. 826 (1933). There is a particular logical
difficulty in holding employees of a distributor to be servants of a refining company because of the rule that agency is a consensual relationship, and a man has
a right to choose his own servants. More liberal courts circumvent this obstacle
by finding that the necessary degree of control exists as a practical matter. Gulf
Refining Co. v. Brown, supra; Roberts v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,
42 Ga. App. 668, 157 S.E. 537 (1931).
Despite the expressed renunciation of an agency relationship in these artfully
drawn contracts, the distributors and retailers are, in reality, most often component parts of one large organization, the control of which is vested in the
refiners. The modern tendency is toward recognition of this unity and toward a
more realistic approach in determining whether the actual right of control remained with the employer. Here the court found itself compelled by Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938)
to apply the substantive law of Georgia in construing this contract. To reach a
desirable result and yet still adhere to the mandate of the Erie doctrine, the
court followed the Georgia law in holding that the contract created the general
relationship of independent contractor to refiner, but treated the particular
transaction resulting in the injury complained of as one performed by the distributor as the servant of the defendant.
ROBERT E. HICKS.

CARRIERS-WHEN IS PASSENGER-CARRIER RELATIONSHIP
TERMINATED
Plaintiffs were passengers on defendant's bus line when the bus on which they
were riding broke down at 1 A.M. about twenty miles from Newark. The driver
reported this mishap by telephone to defendant's manager, and was informed
that another bus would be sent to pick up the passengers. After approximately
one hour had elapsed without the appearance of another bus, plaintiffs tired of
waiting in the cold, and accepted a ride on a Government bus. Shortly thereafter,
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this bus had an accident, as a consequence of which the plaintiffs received injuries
for which they brought this action. Trial Court found for the plaintiffs. On
appeal, Held: Affirmed. Defendant, having caused passengers to be stranded
during a winter night, and having failed for more than an hour to send aid,
was liable to passengers for the negligence of the driver of the Government bus.
Sibley v. City Service Transit Co., 63 A. 2d 708 (N.J. 1949).
A common carrier is under a duty to its passengers to exercise a high degree
of care for their safety, "high degree" meaning, inter alia, a degree of care
commensurate with the risk of danger, Meyonberg v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 165
F. 2d 50 (C.C.A. 3rd 1947); Kinsey v. Hudson & Manhattan R.R. Co., 130
N.J.L. 285, 32 A. 2d 497 (1944), and the greatest degree of care which could
reasonably be expected from human vigilance and foresight, consistent with the
practical operation of that mode of transportation. Dibbert v. Metropolitan Inv.
Co., 158 Wis. 69, 147 N.W. 3 (1914); Anderson v. Harrison, 4 Wash. 2d 265,
103 P. 2d 320 (1940). This rule is not so construed as to make a carrier an
insurer of its passengers, because its liability is based solely on its own negligence. Martin v. Interurban Transp. Co., 15 La. App. 256, 131 So. 514 (1930);
Picou v. Kdnsas City Public Service Co., 156 Kan. 452, 134 P. 2d 686 (1943).
In situations where dangers arise which are not incident to the mode of conveyance, and are not naturally to be apprehended, a more lenient rule is brought
into application, and a carrier owes only the duty of ordinary care. McBride v.
Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 99 N.J. L. 464, 123 Atl. 765 (1924). In all cases it must
be shown that there has been a failure on the part of the defendant to exercise
the proper care in the performance of some legal duty owed to the plaintiff, and
that such failure was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Southwestern Motor Carriers, Inc. v. Nash, 195 Okla. 604, 159 P. 2d 745 (1945).
If, subsequent to a wrongful or negligent act, a new cause intervenes which in
itself is sufficient to produce the injury, the original wrongful act will be considered as too remote to be made the basis of an action. 2 Hutchinson, Carriers,
1025 (3rd Ed. 1906). The absence of causal relationship between the negligent
act of the cdrrier and the injury complained of will defeat an action for negligence against a common carier. Walsh v. Chicago R.R. Co., 294 Ill. 586, 128 N.E.
647 (1920) citing R.C.L.
The legal relationship between a passenger and a carrier, once established,
generally exists until the passenger arrives safely at his destination, and a
temporary departure for a reasonable cause will not terminate the relationship.
Killmeyer v. Wheeling Traction Co., 72 W. Va. 148, 77 S.E. 908, 48 L.R.A. (N.S.)
683 (1913). Where the carrier is instrumental in causing the transfer of a
passenger to some other conveyance, and negligently selects or procures one
which is unsafe, it is not relieved of liability. South Plains Coaches v. Box,
111 S.W. 2d 1151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937). But where the passenger voluntarily
abandons the journey, without any intention to return, the relationship ceases,
Finnegan v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Co., 48 Minn. 378, 51 N.W. 122, 15
L.R.A. 399 (1892) ; and he may no longer hold the carrier to account for any
subsequent injury or inconvenience. Coker v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 245 Ala.
545, 18 So. 2d 84 (1944); Qui Sentit Commodum Sentire Debet et Onus. Thus
where plaintiff, after the train on which she was riding was wrecked, left the right
of way and walked along a highway to a bridge over the track and was injured
when she fell through a hole caused by the explosion after the wreck, she was held
to have abandoned the trip and lost her status as a passenger. Furby v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 286 Pa. 85, 132 At. 796 (1926) ; Cncinnati,H. & L. R. Co. v. Carper,
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Adm'r, 112 Ind. 26, 13 N.E. 122 (1887). When the passenger is injured as a
result of acts taken by him for his own comfort and convenience, the carrier is
not then liable. Kroeger v. Seattle Electric Co., 37 Wash. 544, 79 Pac. 1115 (1905).
There must be an invitation, express or implied, on the part of the carrier that
the plaintiff so act. Hyams v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 216 Mass. 560, 104 N.E.
370 (1914). If a passenger is put to inconvenience as to the place where the
conveyance stopped, he must submit to the situation for a reasonable time, and
if he does not, but so acts as to bring about his own injury, the carrier is not
then liable. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co. v. Butler, 179 Va. 609, 20 S.E. 2d 516
(1942).
The authorities holding carriers to a great degree of responsibility for the
safety of passengers are unquestionably based upon wise public policy. Nothwithstanding the soundness of this policy, the instant case appears to be an
illustration of a good principle's having been subjected to an illogical and unwarranted extension. Plaintiffs in the instant case elected to make their own
way, rather than suffer an inconvenience which defendant apparently did his
best to prevent. To hold the defendants for injuries occasioned under such circumstances, is to make a carrier as an absolute insurer, a liability which has
never before been placed upon them.
PATRICIA BEAUCHAMP.

CHARITIES-HOSPITAL'S RIGHT TO EXEMPTION FROM AD
VALOREM TAXATION WHERE INCOME IS
RECEIVED FROM PATIENTS
Petitioner is a non-profit hospital without capital stock. It admits both "free"
and "pay" patients. Of the total number of hospital days in 1947, a representative year, 31% were fully paid for, 24% partly paid for, and 45% were purely
charitable. All of the income received either from pay patients or from additional outside donations is applied exclusively to hospital maintenance and
operation, and to the care of charitable patients. The City of Atlanta has assessed
the land, buildings and equipment of the hospital, all of which are used solely
in the operation and maintenance of the institution, for city tax purposes. Petitioner seeks to enjoin this assessment and collection, and to prevent an impending tax sale for default, claiming exemption under Art. VII, § 1, Par. 4 of the
1945 Constitution of Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-5404 (1947 Supp.), and by
virtue of the subsequent enabling act of the General Assembly of 1946, as
amended in 1947. Ga. Laws, 1946, p. 12; 1947, p. 1183; GA. CODE ANN. § 92-201
(1947 Supp.). The trial court overruled a general demurrer to the petition and
the defendant revenue collector brings error. Held: Affirmed. Prior to the adoption of the 1945 Constitution this property, even though it belonged to a purely
public charity, would be taxable when used for purposes of "private or corporate
profit or income." However, with this new Constitution, and with the 1946
enabling act, and the 1947 amendment, which added nothing to the 1946 act, the
property is exempt even though income is derived therefrom if the income is
applied exclusively to hospital maintenance and charitable purposes and is not
distributable to anyone having an interest therein. Elder v. Henrietta Eggleston
Hospital For Children, Inc., 53 S.E. 2d 751 (Ga. 1949).
No clear and over-all policy of tax exemption was laid forth in any of the six
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earlier Georgia constitutions, nor in the early legislative enactments based thereon. Education and "the arts" were long fostered, but the almost complete absence
of other types of charitable agencies in the state resulted in a paucity of constitutional and legislative direction. In § III of Title XXVII of the Tax Act of
1851, however, the General Assembly passed a sweeping statute which exempted
from taxation all that it possibly could under the 1798 Constitution of Georgia,
including, in addition to colleges, places of worship and the like, " ... any house
belonging to any charitable institution and the real and personal estate belonging to any charitable institution or connected with the same." Exempted in
the same act was " . . . all stock owned by literary and charitable institutions."
Ga. Laws, 1851-2, pp. 288-292. In The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Solomon's Lodge No. 1 F. & A. M., 53 Ga. 93 (1874), which quoted a
codification of this general exemption provision, the court granted the lodge's
injunction against the assessment of city taxes on its meeting place, pointing
out that "any house" belonging to a charitable institution was exempt. Perhaps
as a partial result of this decision, the franlers of the 1877 Constitution made
a radical change in policy. Stocks and investments in real estate were summarily
removed from the exemption status. Although the legislature was still empowered
to exempt "all institutions of purely public charity," this privilege was delimited
by insertion of the proviso that " . . . the property so exempted be not used for
purposes of private or corporate profit or income." Constitution, 1877, Art. VII,
§ II, Para. I. The legislature used the identical words of the Constitution in
quickly exhausting its privilege. Ga. Laws, 1878-9, p. 33; GA. CoDE, 1882, § 798.
This provision, with slight modifications, remained intact until 1945. See generally Saye, A Constitutional History of Georgia, pp. 302-307 (1948).
It was not until ten years later that a real test of this change was provided.
A testator had set aside real estate and income accumulations therefrom to establish a poor house. His trustees sought to enjoin the assessment of state and
county taxes on the fund. In denying both the injunction and the claimed exemption, The Trustees of the Academy of Richmond County v. Bohler, 80 Ga.
159, 7 S.E. 633 (1887), it was observed that since the proposed institution was
not yet established, there was no res to which the exemption could be applied.
Even if the corporation were in existence, said the court, property used to produce
income to be expended in charity would be too remote from the ultimate charitable object to be exempt. "It is the use of the property which renders it exempt
or non-exempt, not the use of the income derived from it." In Maesenburg v. The
Grand Lodge, F. & A. M. of the State of Georgia, 81 Ga. 212, 7 S.E. 636 (1888)
the property in question was actually being used in part by an existing Masonic
group, as distinguished from the Bohler case, supra. The lower floor, however,
was rented out as a store. Tax exemption was denied because this rental income
was considered to be "private or corporate income" even though it was re-applied
exclusively to the objects of the charity. The proviso of the 1877 Constitution
was quoted to show that no favor to money-making functions of charitable institutions was intended. Further crystalization of this developing doctrine was
effected when it was applied to an entirely different type of factual situation in
Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 292, 30 S.E. 783 (1898). There the main buildings
of a female seminary were denied tax exemption because the institution had
certain "arbitrary" tuition charges to those who were able to pay (and free
admittance to the others). This result was reached despite the fact that additional donations from outsiders were necessary to meet the school expenditures.
Whether the charitable property was competing with other taxable property in
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the state was stressed as a determining factor. The well-reasoned decision in
Linton v. Lucy Cobb Institute, 117 Ga. 678, 45 S.E. 53 (1903) was "designed to
settle the controversy which arose from the Mundy case," supra. The latter was
distinguished in that the tuition fees in that instance were in the nature of
rent, whereas here, said the court, the school fees were merely "incidental." Incidental collections from pew-rent, tuition, or hospital fees, all of which were to
be put back into the steady stream of charity, do not deprive the property of
an otherwise purely public charity of its tax exemption. Brenau Association v.
Harbison, 120 Ga. 929, 48 S.E. 363 (1904) further distinguishes as to the disposition of tuition money in an educational corporation, and Brewer v. American
Missionary Association, 124 Ga. 490, 52 S.E. 804 (1905) allows exemption where
purely "nominal" fees are charged. Income, whether incidental or substantial,
cannot be used or intended for dividends or profits. City of Waycross v. Waycross
Savings & Trust Co., 146 Ga. 68, 90 S.E. 382 (1916). In Richardson v. Executive
Corimittee of the Baptist-Convention, 116 Ga. 705, 169 S.E. 18 (1933) a factual
situation similar to that in the instant case was posed. Charitable patients were
admitted to the hospital, but the:"vast majority" of patients paid. The court
held that there was "corporate profit or income" within the meaning of the
statute. Other decisions, both before and after the Richardson case, supra, have
generally acknowledged that "incidental" income of a hospital, school or other
charity, will not prevent exemption, but to the contrary if the income is so substantial that the charity is, as a result, of a competitive nature, See Hurlbutt
Farm v. Medders, 157 Ga. 258, 121 S.E. 321 (1924) (incidental income exempt);
Mu Beta Chapter Chi Omega House Corporatibn v. Davison, 192 Ga. 124, 14 S.E.
2d 744 (1941) (fraternity property not exempt where membership limited and
lodger paid certain dues as well as full room and board charges); Tharpe v.
Central Georgia Council of Boy Scouts of America, 185 Ga. 810, 196 S.E. 762,
116 A.L.R. 373 (1938) (boy scout council property held exempt even though the
boys paid'a'fee approximating the cost of food at the camp).
The 1945 Constitution would allow little actual change in the existing law,
Art. VII, § 1, Para. 4. Intangible personal property owned by or held in trust
for a charity may now clearly be exempted, but endowment in the form of real
estate as well as any income-producing building is, as before, denied the exemption status. Charities are expressly cautioned, in addition, against distributions
to stockholders or anyone else. The only major difference that might be found
lies in the assumption that something more than incidental income may be derived by charitable property before its exemption status is lost. See Records of
Constitutional Commission of 1943-1944, Vol. 1, pp. 388-395. It must be remembered, however, that the Constitution itself does not directly exempt from taxation property of any kind, but confers upon the General Assembly power to do
so within certain limitations. Walden v. Town of Whigham, 120 Ga. 646, 48 S.E.
159 (1904). In 1946, the General Assembly apparently exhausted its power'to
exempt by using the exact words of the Constitution. Ga. Laws, 1946, p. 12. By
amendment in 1947, "non-profit" hospitals, although long included by interpretation, were expressly provided for, and were defined as follows: " . . . ('non-

profit hospitals') shall mean and include such institutions or hospitals which
may have incidental income from pay patients, provided such income, if any, is
devoted exclusively to (maintenance, etc. and not distributable)." Ga. Laws 1947,
p. 1183. This follows closely the language of the 40-year old Lucy Cobb Institute
case, supra. Yet the court in the instant case reasons that the 1947 amendment
"added nothing to what the General Assembly had previously done by the act
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of 1946." (And it may be inferred from this positive statement that the court did
not believe or did not consider whether it detracted from the act of 1946.) To
the writer it seems clear that the 1947 amendment laid down a much stricter
test of exemption for a non-profit hospital than might be granted to charities in
general by the 1946 act. Would it be reasonable for the legislature to so expressly
declare that "non-profit hospitals" shall mean and include hospitals that have
incidental income from pay patients if the legislature believed that, in 1947, it
was also allowing full exemption to hospital property where a very substantial
percentage of the patients paid in full for services? The 1947 amendment can
hardly be treated as complete superfluity. Yet this is the intendment and position attributed to the General Assembly by the court. The decision here reached
might have been expressly based on the conclusion that the hospital receipts from
pay patients were to be regarded as merely incidental income; a tesult based on
that reasoning could have been reached at any time, past or present. With the
exception of a one year period during which the 1946 enabling act was unamended, a decision involving the instant facts could not be reached on any other reasoning than, this at any time. If the pay were not mere incidental income, as
defined in the earlier cases, then it cannot be such incidental income as is allowable under the 1947 amendment. In any event, the court has seemingly misinterpretated the effect of the 1947 amendment regardless of whether payments'
from the substantial, percentage on non-charitable pitients in the instant case
are treated as incidental.
FRANK C. JONES.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-BREACH OF THE
PEACE ORDINANCE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING FREE SPEECH
While delivering a fanatical. 4ddress at a public meeting, petitioner condemned
a mob which had gathered outside to protest the meeting. He also vidiously
criticized certain political and racial groups held in esteem by the protesters. As
a result, several disturbances occurred. Petitioner was arrested and subsequently
found guilty of disorderly conduct. In construing the pertinent city ordinance,
the trial judge instructed the jury that the phrase, "breach of the peace", as
incorporated therein, included speech which "stirs the public to anger, invites
" Petidispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance ....
tioner did not except to the instruction, but appealed on the ground that the ordinance, as applied to his c6nduct, abridged his right of free speech under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. The judgment was affirmed in
the Appellate and Supreme Courts of Illinois. On Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, Held: Reversed. An ordinance which permits the conviction of
a person merely because his speech stirs others to anger, invites dispute, or
brings about a condition of unrest is unconstitutional. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 69 S.Ct. 894 (1949).
Free speech is included among the fundamental personal rights protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States. Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L. Ed. 1138 (1925). The vitality of our civil and
political institutions depends upon free discussion. Only through free debate and
free exchange of ideas can government remain responsive to the will of the
people. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255, 81 L. Ed. 278 (1937).
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This guarantee of "freedom of speech", however, is not absolute, Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766, 86 L. Ed. 1031 (1942); it may be
restricted when the utterances are inimical to the public welfare, tend to corrupt
public morals, incite crime, disturb the peace, or endanger the foundations of
organized government. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71
L. Ed. 1095 (1927). The United States Supreme Court has permitted reasonable
regulations 'limiting free speech, but it has scrutinized carefully the restrictive
statutes, requiring that freedom of speech not be abridged in the "guise of regulation" by a statute that could be made an "instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression". Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed.
1423 (1939). Accordingly, the test generally applied limits restriction to language which constitutes a "clear and present danger" of a serious substantive
evil rising far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. Bridges v.
California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S. Ct. 190, 86 L. Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346 (1941);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470 (1919).
Although the decision of the principal case has been much discussed, Free
Speech Reaffirmed, New Republic, May 30, 1949, p. 7, col. 3; Much Ado, The
Nation, May 28, 1949, p. 559, col. 1; The Well and the Stars, Time, May 30, 1949,
p. 15, col. 2; How Free Free Speech, Newsweek, May 30, 1949, p. 21, col. 3, and,
in at least one instance, bitterly attacked, Aid and Comfort to the Klan, Collier's,
July 23, 1949, p. 74, col. 1, it actually leaves unchanged the Supreme Court's
traditional attitude toward free speech. Mr. Justice Douglas, who wrote the
majority opinion, specifically reiterated that free speech is "not absolute". He
also reemphasized that it can be limited if "shown likely to produce a clear and
present danger of serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest". Such has been the law for thirty years (See Mr.
Justice Holmes' opinion in the Schenck case, supra). Nevertheless, the majority
holding has been said to tie the hands of local authorities in the punishment of
"rabble rousers" out to create disorder. On the contrary, Douglas' point was not
that local authorities are prohibited from defining "breach of the peace", but that
here the trial judge laid down too broad a definition of what might constitute such
offense. In spite of the fact that the court begged the question of where the
line is to be drawn between freedom of speech and incitement to riot, the decision on the facts is sound. One of the greatest dangers to free speech lies in a
statute so broad that an opposition group can subject the speaker to a readymade prosecution for breach of the peace.
JuLE B. GREENE.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBTVIOLATION OF BAD CHECK LAW
Plaintiff contracted to perform labor for'the defendant. Salary was due and
payable at the end of the week, at which time the defendant gave the plaintiff a
check for services rendered. Payment of the check was refused by the bank on
which it was drawn and it was marked "no account," whereupon the plaintiff
charged the defendant with wilfully, unlawfully and fraudulently issuing the
check in violation of the Mississippi Bad Check Law. The defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court and appealed. Held: Reversed. A maker of a bad
check, drawn in payment of a pre-existing debt, cannot be convicted for violating
the Bad Check Law because such conviction would violate the constitutional pro-
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vision against imprisonment for debt. Blakeney v. State, 39 So. 2d 767 (Miss.

1949).
In considering the problem presented in the instant case, it must be kept in
mind that there are two types of bad check statutes. See note, 95 A.L.R. 500. One
type is modeled after the false pretense statutes, Beach v. State, 28 Okla. Rep.
348, 230 Pac. 758 (1924) ; Broadus v. State, 38 So. 2d 692 (Miss. 1949) ; and makes
it an offense to obtain property, money or services on the strength of the check.
State v. Hack, 284 S.W. 842 (Mo. App. 1926). However, where such property,
money or services are not obtained on the strength of the check, the giver cannot be
convicted under the-statute. Phillips v. State, 24 Ala. App. 456, 136 So. 480 (1931).
But even if they are obtained on the strength of the check, there can be no conviction of the maker unless the element of fraudulent intent is made an element of the
offense. Neidlinger v. State, 17. Ga. App. 811, 88 S.E. 687 (1916). This is because
such statute would be but an instrument for the collection of debt, in contravention
of sound public policy and the constitutional provision against imprisonment for
debt, Burnam v. Commonwealth, 228 Ky. 410, 15 S.W. 2d 256 (1929); and
because such intent cannot be implied. Driskell v. State, 47 Ga. App. 741, 171
S.E. 389 (1933).
The other type bad check statute makes it an offense to draw and utter such
check. State v. Lowenstein, 109 Ohio St. 393, 142 N.E. 897 (1924). Imprisonment
under this law is not unconstitutional as imprisonment for debt since it is not
the non-payment of the debt which is punished, but the fraudulent act in giving
the check. People v. Humphries, 226 App. Div. 500, 234 N.Y. Supp. 688 (1929).
Therefore, the giving of the check makes a prima facie case and the fact that
the check was given for a pre-existing debt is immaterial. Colin v. State, 145
Tex. App. 371, 168 S.W. 2d 500 (1943). Even though fraudulent intent is not
made an element of the offense, the legislature may, for the protection of the
public interest, punish the giving of a bad check without regard to knowledge,
motive, intention or moral turpitude of the doer, and such legislation is constitutional. State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207 Pac. 838 (1922). In any event, if actual
fraud were an element of the crime, the giving of a bad check should constitute
sufficient detriment to the payee to establish an intent to commit it. People v.
Williams, 69 Cal. App. 169, 230 Pac. 667 (1924). It has been held, under this type
statute, that express use of the word "fraud" is unnecessary anid that there will
be fraud in fact because the offense consists, not in obtaining something by
deceit, but putting into circulation worthless commercial paper which will ultimately result in financial loss. State v. Yarboro, 194 N.C. 498, 140 S.E. 216 (1927).
It is immaterial whether one relies on the check or not. State V. Bradley, 190
Wash. 538, 69 P. 2d 819 (1937). The mere fact that the payee has not been
disadvantaged or placed in any worse position than formerly existed does not
prevent the prosecution of the maker of such check. People v. Cortze, 108 Cal.
App. 111, 290 Pac. 1083 (1930).
Since the Mississippi Bad Check ijaw is of the false pretense type, the court,
in the instant case, was fully justified in holding that the defendant could not
be convicted thereunder. Broadus v. State, supra. Within the past thirty years,
several states, formerly having laws of this same type, have amended their
statutes to expressly include checks given for pre-existing debts. State v. Bradley,
supra; People v. Nibur, 238 App. Div. 233, 264 N.Y. Supp. 148 (1933); State v.
Avery, supra; Mo. REV. STAT. § 4305 (1929). The court has, however, implied
that such an attempted amendment would not be held valid in Mississippi. By this
inference, it seemingly places itself in a small minority. The more widely ac-
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cepted view is that the inclusion of checks, drawn for pre-existing debts, within
the purview of such a bad check statute, is not violative of the constitutional
provision against imprisonment for debt.
MCINNIS L. WARD.

CONTRACTS-SUBCONTRACTORS-RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES
FOR DELAYS AND EXTRA WORK FROM GOVERNMENT
Prime contractor, under contract with the federal government to construct a
housing project, brought an action to recover, inter alia, damages on behalf of
certain subcontractors for alleged extra work and for delays and other breaches
by the United States. The prime contract provided that all subcontractors and subcontracts were to be approved by the government, but that nothing contained in
the subcontracts was to create any contractual relationship between any subcontractor and the government. Held: Claim denied. The provision of the prime contract requiring the approval of any subcontract by the government was not sufficient to create privity of contract between a subcontractor and the government,
hence the court was without jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 62 STAT. 869, 28
U.S.C.A. § 1491 et seq. (1948), to consider this claim. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 596 (Ct. Cl. 1949).
Since the United States is not suable as of right, the party who institutes suit
against it generally must bring his case 'thin the authority of some Act of
Congress. United States v. Minnesota Mut. Investment Co., 271 U.S. 212, 46 S. Ct.
501, 70 L. Ed. 911 (1926). Except where Acts of Congress have expressly conferred the right or where by provision in the prime contract the government has
assumed the liability of the prime contractor to the subcontractor, subcontractors
have not been permitted to sue the government. New York Shipbuilding Corp. v.
United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 357 (1926). World War I contracts, for example, provided that in the event the prime contract was terminated for the government's
benefit, the government assumed the liability of the prime contractor to the subcontractor. Such provision clearly brought the subcontractor within the status
of a creditor-beneficiary with respect to damages that he might sustain by reason
of such termination, and a direct action against the government was permitted.
Moneely v. United States, 68 Ct. Cl. 623 (1929); accord, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS Sec. 133 (1933). For illustrations of express congressional delegation of
the right to sue the government in specified instances see, Adams v. United States,
103 Ct. Cl. 769, 60 F. Supp. 200 (1945) (N.I.R.A., 48 STAT. 974, 41 U.S.C.A. § 28
(1934)); Kal Mach. Works, Inc. v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 202, 68 F. Supp.
436 (1946) (Contract Settlement Act of 1944, 58 STAT. 649, 41 U.S.C.A. § 101
(1944)). Under the Tucker Act, supra, suits may be brought against the government upon contracts express or implied. Moon v. Hines, 205 Ala. 355, 87 So. 603,
13 A.L.R. 1020 (1921). In the absence of an express contract, courts have been
unwilling to imply a contract between the subcontractor and the government for
extra work performed by the subcontractor w&ere delays of the government
necessitated such extra work. James Stewart & Co. v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl.
284, 63 F. Supp. 653 (1946); Petrin v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 670 (1945).
However, it has repeatedly been held that the prime contractor may recover on
an implied contract for extra work not contemplated by the original contract,
Wilcox v. United States, 56 Ct. Cl. 224 (1921), and that the value of such extra
work may include services performed by the subcontractor. Hunt v. United
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States, 257 U.S. 125, 42 S. Ct. 5, 66 L. Ed. 163 (1921). Prime contractors also
have consistently been permitted to recover damages from the government for
delays and other interferences, Pope v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 436 (1933), cert.
denied, 288 U.S. 610, 53 S. Ct. 403, 77 L. Ed. 984 (1933), such damages necessarily
including damages sustained by the subcontractor. United States v. Blair, 321
U.S. 730, 64 S. Ct. 820, 88 L. Ed. 1039 (1944). It is to be emphasized that in none
of these cases did the subcontract contain any provision absolving the prime
contractor from liability for delays caused by the government.
The Court of Claims first coped with the present problem in Severin v. United
States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435 (1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 733, 64 S. Ct. 1045, 88 L. Ed.
1567 (1944). There, recovery was denied because of the presence of a provision
in the subcontract absolving the prime contractor from liability for any damage
sustained by the subcontractor as a result of any delays caused by the government. This decision was followed by the holding in James Stewart & Co. v. United
States, supra, that if the prime contractor is not liable to the subcontractor for
damages occurring by reason of delays, then the government is not liable to
the prime contractor for any damages sustained by the subcontractor. "The
reasoning behind these cases is that the contractor is not damaged regardless of
any hardship suffered by the subcontractor, and that the subcontractor may not
sue because there is no privity of contract between him and the government."
Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, supra. The Supreme
Court in United States v. Blair, supra, although denying the existence of either
an express or implied contract which would permit the subcontractor to maintain
an action against the government, held that the prime contractor had an implied
right to recover extra cost and services rendered personally or through a subcontractor. But cf. Corum v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 728 (Ct. Cl. 1949). The
distinction, then, between the Blair case, supra, and the Severin and Stewart
cases, supra, is that in the former there was language in the subcontract approved by the government absolving the prime contractor from liability to the
subcontractor for damages caused by the government.
In view of the widespread practice of subletting various phases of construction
to firms who are specially equipped in particular lines, there should be an adequate remedy whereby subcontractors could be compensated for damages suffered
by delays and other interferences of the government. Two principal theories
have been advanced which would permit recovery by a subcontractor for damages
sustained by him on account of wrongful acts of the government, where the
letting of subcontracts is approved by the latter. (1) The prime contractor may
be treated as the holder of a right as trustee for the subcontractors to have the
government comply with its contract, and the fact that the prime contractor
has relieved himself of liability for violations by the government should not
affect his right to enforce it for the benefit of those harmed by its breach. See,
Continental Ill. Bank & Trust Co., supra, (dissenting opinion). (2) The subcontractor may be classed as a creditor beneficiary with respect to damages that
he might sustain by reason of delays, interferences or other wrongful acts of
the government. Nemers, Problem of Government Liability to Subcontractors
Under Termination CPFFPrime Contract-The Third Party Beneficiary Theory,
31 VA. L. REv. 161 (1944). It is submitted as a third basis, that by construing
the controversial clause of the subcontract as a provision inserted solely for the
benefit of the prime contractor, and not to relieve the government from its own
wrongful act, the desired results would be achieved. With the law in its present
state, subcontractors should be hesitant indeed to enter into contracts contain-
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ing provisions absolving the prime contractor from liability for delays and other
interferences caused by the government, since the effect of such provision is to
render the subcontractor without remedy in such instances.
PAUL J. JONES.

CRIMINAL LAW-CARNAL KNOWLEDGE-STATUTORY
ATTAINED BY MARRIAGE AS DEFENSE

MAJORITY

Defendant had illicit sexual intercourse with a seventeen year old married
female who consented to the act. A statute in that jurisdiction specified that all
minors attained their'majority by marriage. Defendant was convicted under a
statute which provided that any person having sexual relations with a female
between the ages of. thirteen and eighteen was guilty of the crime of carnal
knowledge. On appeal, Held: Affirmed. Statutory majority acquired by marriage
is no defense to the crime of carnal knowledge. State v. Huntsman, 204 P. 2d
448 (Utah 1949).
Although a minor who attains statutory majority by marriage must necessarily remain under certain specific legal disabilities, no grounds thereby arise
for declaring his incapacity in regard to totally different and unrelated matters.
Obviously, marriage would not enable minors to purchase intoxicating liquors,
State v. Seiberling, 143 Mo. App. 318, 127 S.W. 106 (1910) ; or give them full
capacity to contract, Genereux v. Sibley, 18 R.I. 43, 25 Atl. 345 (1892) ; or vest
complete political status, Inhabitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants of Plymouth, 15
Mass. 203 (1818); or remove them from the jurisdiction of a juvenile court.
State v. Wiecking, 200 Minn. 490, 274 N.W. 585 (1937).
The rule prevails in a great majority of American jurisdictions that neither
consent by, nor previous unchasity of, a female is a valid defense in a prosecu-"
tion for carnal knowledge of a female within the prohibited age limits. State v.
Bricker, 135 Iowa 343, 112 N.W. 645 (1907). Approximately a dozen states now
have legislation which permits previous unchastity to operate either as a defense or as a factor in mitigation of punishment. Note, 24 VA. L. REv. 335 (1938).
The criminal statutes on carnal knowledge, carrying with them their irrebuttable
presumptions of incapacity, are also used as a basis for imposition of civil
liability upon hapless defendants. Bishop v. Liston, 112 Neb. 559, 199 N.W. 825
(1924). Contra: Barton v. Bee Line, 238 App. Div. 501, 265 N.Y. Supp. 284 (2d
Dep't 1933).
These rules appear to be based upon the theory that girls under a certain age
are lacking in knowledge of sex matters. To proceed on this theory, in an era of
equality of the sexes and of widespread knowledge and understanding of sex
matters, and particularly in a case involving a married woman almost eighteen
years of age, is patently illogical. The question of capacity to consent should be
answered by the ascertainment of whether a female actually knows the nature
and consequences of the act. Note, 12 N.C. L. REv. 178 (1934). A man who has no
more actual guilt than a woman should not be held legally liable for a greater
guilt, because legal guilt should not be fictitious guilt. Note, 20 VA. L. REV. 592
(1934). The instant case, however, falls squarely within the general rule governing construction of carnal knowledge statutes, since the court found no difficulty
.11 holding that a married woman, only a few dozen hours from her eighteenth
birthday, was incapable of consenting to illicit embraces. It appears that the price
paid by law for a conviction in these cases of technical and fictitious "rape" is
nothing less than a distortion of its own purpose, for the crime committed is only
I. T. O'NEAL, JR.
adultery or fornication.
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DE FACTO OFFICERS -NECESSITY
OF DE JURE OFFICE TO
SUPPORT VALIDATION OF ACTS OF DE FACTO OFFICERS
In a suit to enjoin the mayor and councilmen from exercising rights under a
new city charter, plaintiffs, fifty-five citizens of the city, attacked the constitutionality of the statute granting the charter on the ground that notice of publication of intention to pass the act was not attached to or made a part of the enrolled act, as required by Art. III, § 7, GA. CONST. (1945). The charter under which
defendants acted calls for a mayor and five councilmen; the old charter called
only for a mayor and three. Defendants cross-petitioned, conceding the unconstitutionality of the statute but requesting to be declared de facto officers. The
lower court granted defendants' cross-petition in this regard. On appeal, Held:
Affirmed as to three of the councilmen and reversed as to the others. One cannot
be a de facto officer unless a de jure office exists. Tarpley v. Carr, 204 Ga. 721,
51 S.E. 2d 638 (1949).
The general rule is that there can be no de facto officer in the absence of a de
jure office. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 30 L. Ed. 178
(1886). For a good general discussion of this rule and its reasons, see 2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 502, (2d ed. 1928). This broad rule is deduced
from the principle that there can be no such thing as a de facto office under a
constitutional form of government. A de facto office cannot exist except in the
case of a revolution and the usurpation of all power of government by occupants
exercising a force superior to the constitutional authorities. Coquillard Wagon
Works v. Melton, 137 Ky. 189, 125 S.W. 291 (1910); Oakland Paving Co. v.
Donovan, 19 Cal. App. 488, 126 Pac. 388 (1912). A public office can only exist
by force of law, and an unconstitutional act is said not to be law. Such an act
cannot create an office because it is as inoperative as if it had never been passed.
Norton v. Shelby County, supra; Herrington v. State, 103 Ga. 318, 29 S.E. 931,
68 Am. St. Rep. 95 (1898). The doctrine that the official acts of de facto officers
are validated,- so far as they concern the public and third parties who have an
interest in the acts, springs from motives of public policy and the necessity of
stabilizing the social organization. Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527 (1879);
2 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations§ 504 (2d ed. 1928).
The general rule that a de facto officer necessarily presupposes a de jure office
has on occasion been circumvented by one of three methods. Courts have avoided
constitutional questions to the extent necessary to hold that the office is de jure
when extreme inconvenience would result if the doctrine of de facto officers could
not be applied, as where several large cities are successfully operating under the
questionable statute. State v. Gardner, 54 Ohio St. 24, 42 N.E. 999, 31 L.R.A.
660 (1896). Other courts have applied the de facto officer doctrine where the
power to create a de jure office rested in the legislature but the particular statute
attempting to create the office was unconstitutional. Buck v. Eureka, 109 Cal.
504, 42 Pac. 243, 30 L.R.A. 409 (1895): Some courageous courts have gone so
far as to lay down a broad exception to the rule that a de facto officer presupposes a de jure office, by holding that even though the law purporting to create
an office is void, the incumbent may be a de facto officer until such law has been
adjudged void by the judiciary; in other words, acts antecedent to the judgment
of unconstitutionality are validated. State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep.
409 (1871). See the excellent note, dealing with this last point in 15 L.R.A. (N.S.)
93 (1907). This note discusses Lang v. Bayonne, 74 N.J.L. 455, 68 Ati. 90, 15
L.R.A. (N.S.) 93 (1907). An example of the cases which have laid down this
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broad exception is Walcott v. Wells, 21 Nev. 47, 24 Pac. 367, 37 Am. St. Rep.
478, 9 L.R.A. 59 (1890). There the court applied the de facto officer doctrine to
the acts of a new district judge appointed under a statute increasing the number
of judges from three to four. It conceded the necessity of a de jure office to support a de facto officer but felt that a de jure office existed until a judicial determination of the unconstitutionality of the statute creating the office.
The court in the principal case should have followed the liberal decisions giving
effect to acts performed by de facto officers prior to a judicial determination of
the unconstitutionality of the statutes creating their authority. The officials in
this case acted in good faith pursuant to what they supposed to be valid authority.
Public policy demands that they not be treated as usurpers and the public subjected to unnecessary hardships.
ROBERT E. HICKS.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-CONSTRUCTIVE
ON PROBATE COURT

FRAUD

Decedent husband and plaintiff wife were married and lived in a foreign
country. Decedent deserted plaintiff and came to America and married defendant,
who did not know that he was already married. After living with defendant for
seventeen years, decedent died, leaving his property to the defendant. Defendant,
as executrix, administered the estate and her final accounting was approved by
the Probate Court. Eight years after final accounting, plaintiff, as the legal
widow, brought this proceeding to have the decree opened. Plaintiff contended
that it was constructive fraud for defendant to represent to the Probate Court
that she was the legal widow of decedent. If such representation was constructive
fraud, the Statute of Limitations would not run until plaintiff discovered it, and
she would be entitled to recover. Judgment for defendant was reversed by the
Court of Appeals and the case was brought to the Supreme Court. Held: Reversed. A representation by an executrix of an estate that she is the legal widow
of decedent is not constructive fraud on the Probate Court when such executrix
does not know and has no reason to suspect that decedent was married to another
woman. Pengelly v. Thomas, 151 Ohio St. 51, 84 N.E. 2d 265 (1949).
A constructive fraud is an act or omission not evil in itself, as in actual fraud,
but is adjudged by the law to have the same effect as actual fraud. 1 Story, Equity
Jurisprudence § 258 (4th Ed. 1846). An act is declared a constructive fraud
when its tendency is to deceive or injure others, is detrimental to the public interests, or is contrary to some well founded and traditional policy of the law. Spallholz
9. Sheldon, 158 App. Div. 367, 143 N.Y. Supp. 417 (1913), aff'd, 216 N.Y. 205, 110
N.E. 431 (1915). In a legal sense, a perpetrator of a constructive fraud may be
morally innocent and free from any fault. Markham v. O'Connor, 52 Ga. 183,
21 Am. Rep. 249 (1874). In determining whether constructive fraud exists, the
courts are guided principally by the interests to be protected and the established
policy of the law. Spallholz v. Sheldon, supra.
Generally, the courts deny relief to the widow only when she is in some way
at fault. She must be guilty of such conduct or acts which would make it inequitable and unjust to grant her relief. Woodson v. Colored Grand Lodge of Knights
of Honor of America, 97 Miss. 210, 52 So. 457 (1910); Appeal of Richardson,
132 Pa. St. 292, 19 Atl. 82 (1890). Though a "moral right" in the innocent second
wife is recognized, mere silence or inaction on the part of the deserted wife has
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been held not to deprive her of the rights of a legal widow, even when she knows
that her husband is living with another as his wife. Darrow v. Darrow, 201 Ala.
477, 78 So. 383 (1918); Shaw v. Saxman, 46 App. D.C. 526 (1917). Some courts
hold that when the first wife knows that her husband is living with another as
his Wife and is aware of his whereabouts, she is not estopped from asserting,
against the second wife, her rights in his estate. Dunn v. Portsmouth Say. Bank,
103 Iowa 538, 72 N.W. 687 (1897). Other courts even go to the extent of holding
that the legal widow is not estopped from claiming dower, when, in addition to
being aware of her husband's cohabitation with another woman, she herself is
living in adultery with another man. Reel v. Elder, 62 Pa. 308, 1 Am. Rep. 414
(1869).
In view of the policy of the law and the extent to which the courts will go in
protecting the rights of widows who have been deserted by their husbands, it
seems that the instant case is a departure from the tendency to zealously guard
and protect those rights. Since constructive fraud is a legal fiction invented to
protect vital interests, the court should have declared the representation of the
defendant to the Probate Court to be constructive fraud, so as to protect the
interests of plaintiff. In a period when the institution of marriage is so lightly
regarded by so many, the courts should be very strict in protecting rights incident to it.
J. CARLTON IVEY.

INSURANCE-UNCONDITIONAL DELIVERY OF AN INSURANCE
POLICY BY AN AGENT AS A WAIVER OF
PREPAYMENT OF PREMIUM
Plaintiff, a stock breeder, filed an application for insurance on a valuable bull.
Relevant provisions of the application stipulated that the insurer's agent had no
authority "to waive, alter, change or modify anything contained in this application or the policy which may be issued thereon" and that the policy of insurance
was ineffective until payment of the first premium. Following acceptance of the
application, defendant insurer issued a policy to its agent for delivery to the
plaintiff. The agent, without collecting a premium, mailed the policy to the
plaintiff. Twelve hours after posting and before receipt of the policy by the
plaintiff, the animal died. Following refusal of payment, plaintiff brought suit
and obtained a judgment, and defendant appealed. Held: Judgment reversed
and suit dismissed. The agent's surrender of the policy without collecting the
premium did not have the effect of waiving premium payment as a condition
precedent to effectiveness of the policy. Ferguson v. HartfordLive Stock Ins. Co.,
39 So. 2d 108 (La. 1948).
Where a premium prepayment is a condition precedent to the effectiveness of
an insurance contract, the risk does not attach until payment is made. Thomas v.
Charles Baker & Co., 60 F. 2d 1057 (E.D. Pa. 1932). Inasmuch as a premium
payment clause is for the benefit of the insurer, he may waive the requirement of
the clause. Long v. Home Indemnity Co. of New York, 169 So. 154 (La. App.
1936). Generally, an implied waiver is held to be established by a delivery of the
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policy coupled with an agreement extending premium credit to the insured. As
a consequence, deliver'y of a policy without payment of a premium indicates that
credit was given. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 95 F. 2d 797 (C.C.A. 4th 1938). A minority of courts go further -and hold
that an unconditional delivery of a policy is not only a Waiver of the premium
prepayment but is prima facie evidence of payment of the premium. Maltby v.
The Empire Auto Ins. Association, 239 Ill. App. 532 (1926). Hence a waiver of
a stipulation in a policy that the insurance risk shall not be effective until the
first premium is paid may not be predicated upon a delivery of the policy merely
for the purpose of inspecting it. American Ins. Union v. Lowry, 62 F. 2d 209
(C.C.A. 5th 1.932). Ostensibly the insurer may waive a premium prepayment provision; nevertheless, difficulties immediately arise when a waiver is attempted
by the insurer's ,agent. As a geheral rule, an agent having authority to execute
and issue contracts on behalf of the insurer has the- jower to waive a condition
of prepayment. Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Hairston, 108 Va. 832, 62 S.E. 1057 (1908).
Where such authority in the agent is established, a waiver executed by him will
be upheld notwithstanding the apparent limitations imposed by a provision of the
policy negating the agent's power to alter or waive any of its conlditions. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins..Co. v. National Bank'of Commerce, supra. In the absence
of fraud, an agent without express instructions limiting his power may, by making
an'absolute and unconditional delivery of the policy, effectively waive a provision
of premium prepayment. Christian Benevolent BVrial Ass'n Inc. v. Thornton,
241 Ala. 13, 1 So. 2d 8 (1941). Ordinarily, the charging of the premium to the
agent is sufficient evidence of the agent's authority to waive a premium prepayment clause. Massachusqtts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. National Bank of Commerce,
supra. Obviously when an agent's authority does not include the extending of
premium credit, his delivery of a policy accompanied by assurances of "no hurry"
for the premium payments will not constitute a valid waiver. Davis v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co.,. 7 Fed. Cas. 141, No. 3, 642 (D. Vt. 1876). And delivery of a policy
where there is merely an implied promise of future premium payment at some
indefinite time and no premium credit extended or charged to the agent will not
•effecttiate a waiver by the agent. Lemons v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 196 S.C. 297, 13
S.E. 2d 278 (1941).
It is clear from the above that where a condition precedent of premium ,payment jnay be Waived by the insurer, whether or not an attempted waiver by an
agent is effective will depend on the agent's authority and intention. In the absence of express stipulations in the insurapnce application or policy negating
authority to do so, an agent's waiver of a premium payment will be effective.
Where such express limitations exist, an agent cannot waive a premium payment
clause unless his authority extends beyond such stated limitations. Where it can
be clearly shown that there are limitations imposed upon the authority of 'the
agent by stipulations to that effect in the application and policy, in no jurisdiction can the agent waive a condition of the policy unless it can be affirmatively
shown that the agent had actual authority notwithstanding such limitations.
Failure of such affirmative proof by the plaintiff, in the instant case, fored6omed
his allegations and made it mandatory that the appellate court reverse the trial
court's judgment and dismiss the suit.
RUDOLPH SULLIVAN.
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INTERNAL REVENUE - CORPORATE DISTRIBUTION FOLLOWING
TAX-FREE REORGANIZATION - NON-APPLICABILITY OF "SANSOME" DOCTRINE TO DEFICITS OF LIQUIDATED SUBSIDIARY
CORPORATIONS
Taxpayer was a stockholder in a corporation which, after liquidating five subsidiaries, declared a stock dividend. Liquidation was tax-free and was effected
by the parent corporation's assuming the subsidiaries' assets and liabilities, and
by redeeming and cancelling their outstanding stock. INT. REV. CODE, Sec. 112;
26 U.S.C.A. § 112 (b) (6) (1945) (no immediate recognition to capital gain
or loss). At the time of liquidation, the parent corporation had accumulated and
current profits; the subsidiaries showed an aggregate net deficit. Taxpayer conceded that portion of the distribution which was paid out of the current earnings
of the parent to be dividends and taxable income but contended that the Sansome rule required the deficits to be carried over and subtracted from the accumulated earnings of the parent. A fortiori, since the deficits off-set the accumulated earnings, that portion of the distribution paid out of such earnings should
be a return of capital and not dividends. Tax Court's decision in favor of the
taxpayer was affirmed by the Circuit Court and certiorari was granted. Held:
Reversed. In tax-free liquidation where the parent corporation has earnings and
subsidiaries have a deficit, such deficit is not carried over and deductable from
the parent's earnings as a corollary of the Sansome rule; this rule is not based
on a continuity of corporate enterprise but on the necessity to prevent tax evasion.
Commissioner v. Phipps, 69 S.Ct. 616 (1948).
The Sansome rule originated thus: Corporation "A" sold its assets to Corporation "B"; "B" assumed all of "A's" liabilities and issued new stock to "A's" stockholders in their original proportionate holdings. Though this reorganization was
tax-free and the assets of "A" included a large accumulated surplus of undivided earnings, "B" was unable to make any profits and soon dissolved. Because
the liquidating distribution did not exhaust the accumulated earnings of predecessor "A", the Commissioner contended the distribution to be dividends and not
a return of capital. The Circuit Court agreed, holding that since the reorganization was non-taxable, the accumulated earnings of the predecessor retained their
status as such for purposes of subsequent distribution and were taxable to the
recipients as dividends. Commissioner v. Sansome, 60 F. 2d 931 (C.C.A. 2d 1932),
cert. denied, 287 U.S. 667. This doctrine of earnings retaining their identity when
transferred to a successor by virtue of a tax-free reorganization has not only been
consistently followed judicially, but has received explicit Congressional approval.
Fain v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 1008 (C.C.A. 5th 1935), cert. denied 296 U.S. 588
(1935) ; U. S. TREAs. REG. 94, Art. 115-11 (1935) ; U. S. TREAS. REG. 103, § 29.11511 (1940). And although the rule's operation is clear, its theory has been nebulous
and questioned. The Sansome case, supra, indicates the basis to be that of a
"continued venture" in the corporate successor by the stockholders of the predecessor. This'line of thought is lent plausibility by courts invoking the rule where,
although the corporate successor has differed from the predecessor in some degree, the stockholders remain unchanged. E.g., Murchinson's Estate v. Commissioner, 76 F. 2d 641 (C.C.A. 5th 1935) (joint-stock association to corporation);
Reed Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 130 F. 2d 288 (C.C.A. 6th 1942) (intrastate
to interstate operation); United States v. Kauffman, 62 F. 2d 1045 (C.C.A.
9th 1933) (change in name). Other decisions unequivocally evidence that a con-
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tinuity of corporate enterprise by the original owners is an inaccurate analysis
of the theory, since the rule has .been applied even though a change in proprietorship has been effected. E.g., Robinette v. Commissioner, 148 F. 2d 513 (C.C.A.
9th 1945) (liquidation of subsidiary) ; Barnes v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 282
(E.D. Pa. 1938) (successor received part of predecessor's estate; Stella K. Mandel, 5 T. Ct. 684 (1945) (split-off reorganization); Cable v. Commissioner, 102
F. 2d 977 (C.C.A. 2d 1939), cert. denied 308 U.S. 575 (1939) (merger of several predecessors). That taxpayers would attempt to take advantage of the
resulting confusion was natural, and as usually follows, clarification ensued. The
inherent unsoundness of the continued venture theory was vividly demonstrated
when a court extended it to its logical conclusion and held a distribution to be a
return of capital on the sole basis that the ownership of the successor corporation was so unlike that of the predecessor as to lack the requisite continuity of
corporate enterprise. Commissioner v. Munter, 157 F. 2d 132 (C.C.A. 3rd
1946), rev'd. 331 U.S. 210, 67 S. Ct. 1175, 91 L. Ed. 1441 (1947). The tax-evasive
possibilities of this ruling are obvious: dividends, via a tax-free reorganization
incorporating a substantial change in corporate ownership, may be converted into
a return of capital. This open invitation to tax avoidance was immediately reversed and the basis of the rule was clarified to be that the Congressional purpose
to tax recipients of corporate earnings may not be frustrated by tax-free reorganizations which leave profits presently undistributed but available for later distribution. Commissioner v. Munter, 331 U.S. 210, 67 S. Ct. 1175, 91 L. Ed. 1441
(1947). The Munter case, immediate supra, in establishing the true basis of the
Sansome rule also disproved, via carried over profits, the supposed continued
venture theory of the rule. Notwithstanding that this decision was not rendered
in time to affect the instant case in its progress through the Tax and Circuit
Courts, the theory of a continuity of corporate enterprise was inevitably doomed
because of its like vulnerability to tax avoidance when applied to deficits.
As a corollary to the rule's operation of carrying over the profits, the lower
courts in the instant case applied it to the deficits and because the parent corporation's earnings were more than off-set by the subsidiaries' deficits, that portion of the distribution paid out of such earnings was held to be a return of
capital. Margaret R. Phipps, 8 T. Ct. 190 (1947); Commissioner v. Phipps, 167
F. 2d 117 (C.C.A. 10th 1948). The fallacy of this correlation is in incorporating
general corporate accounting principles into the Sansome rule; actually, what
agreement exists between the two is purely coincidental. The very existence of
the rule evidences judicial and legislative intent that federal taxation be pursued on a practical level and not be dependent on the subtleties and complexities
of corporate accounting practice. Further, under normal accounting principles,
the deficits of a corporation can exist no longer than the corporation itself, but
obviously the earnings can. Hence the basis and purpose of the rule is clear
when the subsidiary's earnings and deficits are viewed absent the reorganization. On the one hand, the earnings continue to exist even though the subsidiary
has terminated, and therefore are taxable dividends whenever distributed. On
the other hand, during the subsidiary's life, its deficits have no effect on the
parent's distribution so long as the parent has earnings available for such purposes; hence, unless these deficits terminate with the subsidiary, the parent has
an advantage taxwise which it would not have absent the liquidation. Arbitrary
though the operation of the rule may seem to be, it is justified in that the
rule limits the tax-freeness of Sec. 112 of the Code, supra, to its sole function of
facilitating corporate reorganizations and prevents the utilization of such re-
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organizations as a means to tax avoidance. Otherwise, one corporation, having
large accumulated earnings may absorb at no cost to itself another corporation
with an equally large deficit, and after neutralizing its earnings with the absorbee's deficits, may distribute the earnings as a return of capital and not as
the dividends they actually are. From the viewpoint of a sound tax policy, the
Supreme.Court in the instant case wisely decreed and established that the deficits
of a predecessor shall not fall within the scope and operation of the Sansome
rule.
JOHN S. KWARCHAK.

LEGISLATION-STATUTORY INTERPRETATION-ABATEMENT
REVIVAL OF CLAIM FOR PERSONAL INJURY AGAINST
ESTATE OF DECEASED WRONGDOER

AND

Plaintiff brought this action to recover for personal injuries sustained by an
automobile collision alleged to have been caused by the negligence of one Copenhaver. The latter died subsequent to the collision and this action was brought
against his executrix. It was the contention of plaintiff that his cause of action
survived the death of the tortfeasor, by virtue of a statute which provided that
"any person, or the personal representative of any person, may maintain an
action against the executor or administrator of any testator or intestate who in
his lifetime has wasted, destroyed, taken, or carried away, or converted to his
own use, the property of any such person or committed any trespass on the real
property of such person". CAL. PROB. CODE ANN. § 574 (1944). Plaintiff's contention was that the word "property", as used in the statute, included a lessening
of his estate, in that his future earning power as a chemical engineer was reduced in proportion to the extent of his injury. The trial court dismissed the
action and plaintiff appealed. Held: Reversed. A personal injury which results
in the loss of future earning power amounts to a lessening of the estate of the
injured party and has wasted his "property" in the sense in which that word
was used in the statute. Moffat v. Smith, 206 P. 2d 353 (Cal. 1949).
At common law, causes of action ex delicto died with the wrongdoer. The principle was expressed in the Latin maxim, Actio personalis moritur cum persona.
Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527, 150 Pac. 357, L.R.A. 1916A, 1142 (1915); Henshaw v. Miller, 17 How. 212, 15 L. Ed. 222 (1854). The principle, however, was
never a favorite with the courts, and was limited to strictly personal actions.
Sullivan v. Associated Billposters and Distributors, 6 F. 2d 1000, 42 A.L.R. 503
(C.C.A. 2d 1925); Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 573, 162 S.W. 584,
49.L.R.A. (N.S.) 897 (1914). Consequently, a great number of exceptions were
established even before the rule was changed by statute. Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo.
1, 288 Pac. 524, 70 A.L.R. 106 (1930). The principle was never recognized
in equity. Schley v. Dixon, 24 Ga. 273, 71 Am. Dec. 121 (1858). The origin of the
doctrine of non-survival of personal rights of action is rather obscure. Pollock,
Law of Torts, pp. 66-72 (12 Ed. 1923). Probably the best explanation lies in
the fact that the law of torts is incidental to and grew out of the criminal law,
where punishment of the defendant was impossible after his death. Prosser on
Torts, pp. 950-951 (1941 Ed.). The common law rule in England was changed by
statutes which were construed to permit actions for torts committed against personal property to survive the death of the plaintiff, Russel's Case, 5 Coke Rep.
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27a, 77 Eng. Rep. 91 (1565) ; but not the death of the defendant. Smith v. Colgay,
Cro. Eliz. 384, 78 Eng. Rep. 630 (1595). This was the view of the common law
taken by the American courts. Petts v. Ison, 11 Ga. 151, 56 Am. Dec. 419 (1852) ;
Swartz v. Rosenkrans, 78 Colo. 167, 240 Pac. 333 (1925); unless the estate of
the deceased defendant was unjustly enriched so as to bring the case within a
quasi-contractual relationship. Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 22 S. Ct. 493, 46
L. Ed. 713 (1902). But there was no survival in case of injuries to real property,
Sims v. Davis, 70 S.C. 362, 49 S.E. 872 (1904), or for injuries to the person based
on negligence. Hilliker v. Citizens' St. R. Co., 152 Ind. 86, 52 N.E. 607 (1899);
Clark v. Goodwin, supra. All jurisdictions now have survival statutes, all of them
differing in varying degrees. Prosseron Torts, supra, p. 953.
The fundamental rule of statutory construction and the primary object in any
case involving a statute is to determine the intention of the legislature. United
States v. N. E. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 62 S. Ct. 445, 86 L. Ed. 671
(1942). The numerous rules of interpretation for the guidance of the courts are
for the purpose of determining that intent, and will not be used to defeat the
paramount will of the legislature. Posselius v. First National Bank, 264 Mich.
687, 251 N.W. 429, 90 A.L.R. 342 (1933). It is a familiar rule that a word or
words in a statute will be interpreted to mean that which best harmonizes with
the context. People of Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 58 S. Ct. 167,
82 L. Ed. 235 (1937). In some jurisdictions, it is held that survival statutes are
remedial in nature and will be liberally construed. Harbin v. O'Rear, 219 Ala. 173,
121 So. 547 (1929), while in other jurisdictions, it is held that they are not
remedial but are in derogation of the common law and will be strictly construed.
Showen v. MetropolitanSt. R. Co., 164 Mo. App. 41, 148 S.W. 135 (1912) ; People
v. Taylor, 342 Ill. 88, 174 N.E. 59 (1930).
In the instant case the meaning of the word "property", as used in the statute,
was the determining factor. "Property signifies every species of property. It is
nomen generalissimum, and comprehends all a man's worldly possessions."
Rosseter v. Simmons, 6 Serg. & R. 452, 456 (Pa. 1821); 34 WORDS AND PHRASES
405 (Perm. Ed. 1940). But its particular meaning in any case must be determined
by its context and the sense in which it was intended to be used by the legislature.
Ponsonby v. Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co., 210 Cal. 229, 291 Pac. 167
(1930). The California Probate Code, § 574, was enacted as a revision of certain
earlier sections in 1931, and governs this case: "Executors and administrators
may maintain an action against any person who has wasted, destroyed, taken, or
carried away, or converted to his own use, the property of their testator or intestate, in his lifetime, or committed any trespass on the real property of the decedent in his lifetime; and any person, or the personal representative of any
person, may maintain an action against the executor or administrator of any
testator or intestate who in his lifetime has wasted, destroyed, taken, or carried
away, or converted to his own use, the property of any such person or committed
any trespass on the real property of such person." Prior to the recodification of
the laws of California b'y the Code Commission in 1931, the provisions of § 574
of the present Probate Code had been embodied in §§ 1583 and 1584 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. These two sections were combined by the Commission into
§ 574 of the present Probate Code, with the substitution of the word "property"
for "goods" in § 1583 and for "goods and chattels" in § 1584. The words "real
estate" appearing in both the old sections were changed to "real property" by
the Code Commission, and were incorporated into § 574 of the Probate Code. See
Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal. 2d 288, 169 P. 2d 913, 171 A.L.R. 1379 (1946) (dis-
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senting opinion). In its report proposing the adoption of a Probate Code, the
Code Commission said that "its powers are limited to preparing such 'restatement
as will best serve clearly and correctly to express the existing provisions of law',
and it is not within the province of the Code Commission to embody in its report
any substantial changes in the existing law." See Hunt v. Authier, aupra.
In view of the circumstances surrounding the enactment of the Probate Code
and the particular wording of § 574, the court in the instant case gave the statute
a broader meaning than was intended by the legislature. By the context in which
the word "property" was used in § 574-i.e., property such as could be "wasted,
destroyed, taken, or carried away, or converted", words incident to the physical
handling of property-it is self-evident that "property" was not intended to
convey such a broad meaning as was given to it by the majority opinion. The
wisdom or lack of wisdom of a particular statute is not for the courts to decide,
Nichols v. Board of Canvassers of Onondaga County, 129 N.Y. 395, 29 N.E. 327
(1891), nor the reasons or motives of the legislature in including or omittting
certain provisions. Ellis v. Boer, 150 Mich. 452, 114 N.W. 239 (1907).
J. CARLTON IVEY.

SALES-RECORDATION PROVISION OF CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
AS APPLIED TO INTRASTATE COMMERCE
Plaintiff bought an airplane from one Green, intending to operate it exclusively
within the state. Plaintiff received no bill of sale of the form prescribed by the
Civil Aeronautics Administration, and agreed that the title should remain in
Green's name on the records of the Civil Aeronautics Administration. Subsequent
to this sale defendant, in good faith and without notice of any claim or title of
the plaintiff, purchased the same airplane from Green. Defendant immediately
forwarded his bill of sale to the Civil Aeronautics Administration along with an
application that the airplane be registered in his name, and received a registration
certificate from the Administration showing that title to the airplane was vested
in defendant. Plaintiff brought this action in bail-trover to recover the airplane.
Trial court directed a verdict for plaintiff. On appeal, Held: Reversed. Since
Federal control over airways is a logical extension of Federal control over navigable waters, the recording provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act, which are
akin to recording provisions of the Federal statutes dealing with vessels, apply
to all airplanes, even though they are operated only in intrastate commerce.
Therefore, a purchaser having no actual knowledge of prior unrecorded title,
receiving registration certificate from the Civil Aeronautics Administration showing that transfer of ownership has been duly recorded, has title superior to that
of any other person. Blalock v. Brown, 51 S.E. 2d 610 (Ga. App. 1949).
Recordation of title to chattels is generally governed by local laws. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE § 68-205 (1933). Recordation of ships, including those engaged entirely in intrastate activities, has long been required by the Federal Government.
9 STAT. 440 (1850) as amended, 41 STAT. 100 (1920), 46 U.S.C.A. § 921 (Supp.
1946). Under the original Air Commerce Act of 1926, registration was required
only of those aircraft operating in interstate or foreign commerce. 44 STAT. 574
(1926).

With the enactment of the CIVIL AERONAUTICS

ACT in 1938 Congress

clearly included all aircraft, by omitting the phrase of the Act of 1926, "interstate or foreign commerce," and made it unlawful to operate any plane unless
registered. 52 STAT. 1005 (1938), 49 U.S.C.A. § 521 (1946).
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Federal power to so affect intrastate activity has been established by two doctrines. The first is the "practical necessity" of regulating intrastate instruments
in order to effectuate interstate policy. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed. 609 (1941); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937) ; Railroad
Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563, 42 S. Ct. 232,
66 L. Ed. 371 (1922). Though certain activities may be intrastate in character
when considered separately, if they have such a close and substantial relationship to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress has the power to
exercise that control. National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., supra. If a Federal Act is devoted to the promotion of safety and efficiency
in interstate commerce, and if the Act bears some reasonable and rational relationship to the subject over which it has assumed to act, the power of the Federal Government is supreme, although it may include within its scope activities
which are intrastate in character. Rosenhan v. United States, 131 F. 2d 932
(C.C.A. 10th 1942). The highly mobile nature of aircraft, in comparison with
other forms of transportation, results in a greater likelihood that it will shift
from intrastate to interstate commerce. Individual state recordation statutes,
without the centralized Federal system, would make the determination of the
agency with which the instrument of title was filed depend upon the transitory
status of the aircraft. 48 COL. L. REv. 1248 (1948). Limitation on the power of
Congress to regulate this recording of instruments affecting title would result in
the general ineffectiveness of the system of control over aviation. United States
v. Drumm, 55 F. Supp. 151 (D.C.D. Nev. 1944).
The second doctrine, and the one relied on by the instant case, is based on Federal control over navigable media, and employs an analogy between navigable
streams and navigable air space. In re Veterans Air Express Co., Inc., 76 F. Supp.
684 (D.C.D. N.J. 1948). Congress' dominion over navigable waters arises from
its commerce and admiralty powers, and extends even to those waters located
entirely within a single state. Escanaba and Lake Michigan Transp. Co. v.
Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 2 S. Ct. 185, 27 L. Ed. 442 (1883) ; The Scow No. 1,
169 Fed. 717 (D.C.E.D. N.Y. 1909). This jurisdiction is co-extensive with the
needs of commerce. United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311
U.S. 377, 61 S. Ct. 291, 85 L. Ed. 243 (1940). But Federal admiralty jurisdiction has been held not applicable to aircraft; The Crawford Bros. No. 2, 215
Fed. 269 (D.C.W.D. Wash. 1914); even where the airplane involved is adapted
for navigation on water. Noakes v. Imperial Airways, Limited, 29 F. Supp. 412
(D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1939). In deciding the case of In re Veterans Express Co., supra,
the court expressed the view that control over aviation activity was a logical
extension of the Congressional control over navigable waters, since "there is no
section of the navigable circumambient atmosphere of the United States which
is not a part of a continuous channel for commerce among the states". But Federal control over navigable waters obtained under the admiralty clause is much
more comprehensive than that derived from the commerce clause. Willoughby,
The Constitution of the United States, Vol. 2, page 950 (2d Ed. 1929). Therefore, it follows that any exercise of jurisdiction over intrastate aircraft under
the commerce clause should come from practical necessity. Railroad Commission
of Wisconsin v. Chicago,B. & Q. R. Co., supra.
In the instant case the court seems to have seized upon the fact that the word
"navigation" was applicable both to ships and to aircraft, and by a form of
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syllogistic reasoning, arrived at their conclusion that Federal control of the
latter was but a logical extension of the control exercised over the former. This
seems both unreasonable and unnecessary. The policy of the Act is expressly declared to be the regulation of air commerce in such a manner as to best promote
its development and safety and to encourage and develop civil aeronautics. 52
STAT. 980, 49 U.S.C.A. § 402 (1938). It seems logical that a uniform system of
registration of aircraft would be a means of effectuating this policy. Since this
system bears a "reasonable relationship to the subject over which Congress has
assumed to act", Rosenhan v. United States, supra, the instant case would fit
much more comfortably under the doctrine of practical necessity and public
convenience.
PATRICIA BEAUCHAMP.

TORTS-DUTY OWED BY SPONSOR TO "SOAP BOX DERBY"
SPECTATORS
Plaintiff brings action for damages resulting from personal injuries. The petition contained the folloving allegations: A certain street was set aside in the
City of Macon, Georgia, to the defendant newspaper to sponsor as a business
promotional scheme the "Soap Box Derby" for boys having homemade momentum-propelled automobiles. Prizes were offered to the contestants and the public
was invited. While the plaintiff was standing in a place designated for spectators,
one of the cars left its course and struck her, thereby inflicting upon her numerous
injuries. The trial court overruled the defendant's general and special demurrers.
On appeal, Held: Affirmed. Defendant was the occupier of a city street and owed
spectators present at its invitation ordinary care in keeping the premises reasonably safe for them. Whether the place provided for spectators was safe, and
questions as to the sponsor's negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence
and assumption of risk are for the jury to decide. Macon Telegraph Publishing
Co. v. Graden, 53 S.E. 2d 371 (Ga. 1949).
One who uses city property with the knowledge and acquiescence ofo the municipality is the occupier of the land. Soles v. Ohio Edison Co., 144 Ohio St. 373,
59 N.E. 2d 138 (1945). There is a clear distinction between a licensee and an
invitee, and an' equally clear distinction as to the duty of the occupier of the
land in the two cases. A licensee is a person who is neither a trespasser, passenger, nor servant, and does not stand in any contractual relation with the occupier
of the premises, but who is permitted to go thereon for his own interggtewnvenience, or gratification. Petree v. Davison-Paxon-Stokes Co., 30 Ga. Ipp. 4,
118 S.E. 697 (1923). According to the allegations of the petition, the plaintiff
in the instant case is definitely an invitee. An invitee is one who comes upon the
land of another by express or implied invitation. Lordi v. Spiotta, 133 N.J.L. 581,
45 A. 2d 491 (1946). The status of invitee is implied where a person goes upon the
land of another for the benefit of both parties. Guilford v. Yale University, 128
Conn. 449, 23 A. 2d 917 (1942). The fact that the occupier of land, even as a
trespasser against the true owner, receives no pecuniary benefit therefrom, does
not relieve him of the duty of exercising ordinary care in rendering the premises
safe for invitees. Hotel El Rancho, Inc. v. Pray, 64 Nev. 591, 187 P. 2d 568
(1947).
Any occupier of land who expressly or impliedly invites others to come upon
the premises for any lawful purpose is liable to such persons for injuries caused
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by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises safe. Goettee v.
Carlyle, 68 Ga. App. 288, 22 S.E. 2d 854 (1942); GA. CODE § 105-401 (1933).
This code section does not apply to licensees. Smith v. Jewell Cotton Mill Co., 29
Ga. App. 461, 116 S.E. 17 (1923). The proprietor of a place of entertainment is
charged with the duty to exercise all proper precautions, skill, and care to make
the premises safe as is consistent with practical operations. Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. Le Normand, 100 F. 2d 160 (C.C.A. 5th 1938). Also, he is liable for failure
to warn patrons of dangers of which he knew, or of which it was his duty to
know in the exercise of ordinary care. Tybee Amusement Co. v. Odum," 51 Ga.
App. 1, 179 S.E. 415 (1935). "Ordinary care" or "reasonable care" is a relative
term, and no absolute test will govern each and every situation affecting a place
of public amusement. Olsen v. John Hamrick's Tacoma Theaters, 9 Wash. 2d 380,
115 P. 2d 718 (1941). It is only natural that a spectator should desire to station
himself as close to the exhibition as safety will permit. In his selection of a seat
or a place to stand he must rely upon the superior knowledge of the proprietor
or sponsor. Arnold v. State, 163 App. Div. 253, 148 N.Y. Supp. 479 (1914). It
should, then, be the duty of 'the latter to see that the seats and places where spec:tators are allowed to stand are so located that they are protected from foreseeable
accidents, and to provide sufficient warning of the danger, and to fence and rope
off dangerous areas. Blue Grass Fair Association v. Bunnel, 206 Ky. 462, 267
'S.W. 237 (1924). Whether newspaper publisher and automobile dealer, sponsors
of a "Soap Box Derby", are negligent in failing to provide a barricade to prevent
injuries to spectators is a question for the jury. Murphy v. Jarvis Chevrolet Co.,
a10 Ill. App. 534, 34 N.E. 2d 872 (1941).
Generally, a spectator at any place of amusement assumes the risk of, and
owes a duty to protect himself against dangers which are incidental to the occasion that are known to him, or are so obvious that a reasonable and prudent
man should know under the circumstances. Young v. Ross, 127 N.J.L. 211, 21 A.
2d 762 (1941). Because the dangers of baseball games are matters of common
knowledge, courts have almost unanimously held that patrons who choose seats
that are unscreened -assume the risk of being struck by balls. Hull v. Oklahoma
City Baseball Co., 196 Okla. 40, 163 P. 2d 982 (1945); see Note, 142 A.L.R. 868.
But patrons do not assume the risk of dangers they might encounter upon premises which they could not have been reasonably expected to foresee. Lenoine v.
Springfield Hockey Association, 307 Mass. 102, 29 N.E. 2d 716 (1940). To support a conclusion that there is a voluntary assumption of risk, it is necessary to
find that the plaintiff had actual knowledge and actual appreciation of the risk
involved. Thomas v. Quartermaine, 18 Q.B.D. 685 (1885).
By virtue of the foregoing authority, not only the question of the defendant's
negligence, but also the degree of care owed to the plaintiff should be determined
by the jury. The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that spectators at
public places of amusement assume the risks that are incidental thereto, but because of the novelty of the "Soap Box Derby" the court in the principal case was
correct in holding that the issues should be submitted to the jury.
MARVIN M. DEAN.
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TORTS-IMMUNITY OF HIGHWAY "MAINTENANCE MAN" FOR
NEGLIGENT PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES
Defendant, a state highway "maintenance man," was operating a truck with
a snow plow attached for the purpose of clearing the highway of snow. Because
of the failure of his helper to look up the highway at the intersection, defendant
ran into a car driven by one of the plaintiffs, causing injuries. The trial court
found that there was no misconduct other than possible ordinary negligence, and
directed a verdict for the defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Held: Reversed. The defendant was engaged
in a "governmental" rather than a "ministerial" function in moving snow and
ice from the highways, and was not liable for mere defects in judgment in carrying out his duties. Mower v. Williams, 84 N.E. 2d 435 (Ill. 1949).
Where an officer is invested with a duty that is purely ministerial, he will be
liable to persons who are injured by reason of negligent or unskillful performance of that duty. Rowley v. Cedar Rapids, 203 Iowa 1245, 212 N.W. 158, 53
A.L.R. 375 (1927); Robinson v. Chamberlain, 34 N.Y. 389, 90 Am. Dec. 713
(1866). But if the officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise
his judgment in matters brought before him, he is usually given immunity from
liability to persons who may be injured as the result of an erroneous decision.
Blake v. Brothers, 79 Conn. 676, 66 Atl. 501, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 501 (1907). A
ministerial duty is one in regard to which no discretion is left in the officer
on whom the duty is imposed, one involving the mere execution of a set task
with a set time, mode and occasion prescribed by law for its performance. Grider
v. Tally, 77 Ala. 422, 54 Am. Rep. 65 (1884) ; Chicago v. Seben, 165 Ill. 371, 46
N.E. 244, 56 A.L.R. 245 (1897). Thus, it has been held that one who repairs the
highway or drives a vehicle is not an officer who is protected. Tholke8 v. Decock,
125 Minn. 507, 147 N.W. 648, 52 L.R.A. (N.S.) 142 (1914); Florio v. Schmolze,
101 N.J.L. 535, 129 Atl. 470, 40 A.L.R. 1353 (1925). And it makes no difference
that the municipality, state or government agency which employs the officer is
absolutely immune from liability for the negligent act. Short v. Town of Orange,
175 App. Div. 260, 161 N.Y. Supp. 466 (1916). Some courts hold that even in the
case of a purely ministerial act, the injury, to be compensable, must be the result
of misconduct in performance of the act, and that mere nonfeasance will give
rise to no liability. Stevens v. North States Motor, Inc., 161 Minn. 345, 201 N.W.
435 (1925). Other courts have held that an officer is liable for his personal acts
of misfeasance whether he is engaged in a ministerial or governmental task.
Shirkey v. Keokuk County, 225 Iowa 1159, 281 N.W. 837 (1938); Moynihan v.
Todd, 188 Mass. 301, 74 N.E. 367, 108 Am. St. Rep. 473 (1905). Public office
or employment should not be made a shield to protect careless public officials
from the consequence of their misfeasance in the performance of their public
duties. Florio v. Schmolze, supra. Immunity should not be extended to a person
who is employed upon public works, unless his function is clothed with discretion,
for the compelling reasons of nonliability of officers are entirely absent. Miller v.
Jones, 224 N.C. 783, 32 S.E. 2d 594 (1945). It has been suggested *by some
writers that the determination of liability by distinguishing between ministerial
and governmental functions is so diffcult of application that it should be abolished.
See Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L. REV. 263
(1937).
Different courts have reached opposite results on factual situations substantially the same as that presented by the principal case. Compare Price v. State
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Highway Commission, 62 Wyo. 385,.167 P. 2d 309 (1946), with Miller v. Jones, supra. In the latter case it was stated, "Of course, a mere employee doing a mechanical job, as were the defendants here, must exercise some sort of judgment in plying
his shovel or driving his truck-but he is in no sense invested with a discretion
which attends a public officer in the discharge of public or governmental duties,
not ministerial in their character." Regardless of what approach one uses to
the facts of the principal case, it is submitted that most courts would hold that
the defendant was engaged in a ministerial function and that the injury was
due to misfeasance; thus, liability would attach.
JAMES

B.

O'CONNER.

WILLS-ADOPTED CHILD NOT INCLUDED IN DEVISE TO 'CHILDREN
OF THE CHILDREN'-EFFECT OF 1949 STATUTORY AMENDMENT
Testator's will provided for a distribution of his estate to the "children of the
children" of several brothers, after the termination of a life estate granted to
his wife. Plaintiff was an adopted child of a brother's child, having been adopted
prior to the execution of the will. Plaintiff filed a petition claiming a right to
share in the estate as one of the "children of the children." A demurrer to this
petition was sustained in the trial court. On appeal, Held: Affirmed. Where
property is devised to the "children of the children" of a testator's brother, an
adopted child of the brother's child does not take as a beneficiary. To all persons
other than the adoptive parents, the status of the adopted child is the same as
if no act of adoption had occurred. Brookins v. Citizens & Southern National
Bank, 52 S.E. 2d 461 (Ga. 1949).
This is the first time a court in Georgia has been called upon to determine
whether a child, adopted prior to the execution of the testator's will, is included
in a devise to the "children of the children" of the testator's brother. The only
similar Georgia case involved a child adopted subsequent to the execution of the
will and death of testator. Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E. 2d 420, 144 A.L.R.
664 (1940). Although this is a novel question in Georgia, it has been presented
in other jurisdictions and the results are far from uniform. Notwithstanding the
lack of uniformity, the results reached by other courts are of doubtful help.
Courts have often noted the "utter futility and useless waste of paper involved
in the practice of citing precedents interpreting the language employed by other
testators in different wills and urging their results as persuasive in the present
instance." In re Montgomery's Estate, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (1938). A brief glance
at a few of the conflicting decisions makes it apparent that it is indeed a futile
and useless waste of paper to cite precedents as an aid in interpreting a testamentar'y paper.
Some courts follow the canon of interpretation, set forth in Wood v. Miteham,
92 N.Y. 375 (1883), that where a will is capable of two interpretations, that
one should be adopted which prefers those of the blood of the testator to stangers.
It has been ruled that a testator who in a will provides for his own child or
children will be presumed to have included an adopted child, while a testator
who provides for the child or children of another will be presumed not to have
included an adopted child. Beck v. Dickinson, 99 Ind. App. 463, 192 N.E. 899
.(1934). The New Hampshire courts also follow this rule. Where a will devised
property to the "children" of a son, after the termination of a trust, an adopted
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child did not take as a beneficiary. Parker v. Carpenter, 77 N.H. 453, 92 Atl. 955
(1915). However, under a similar set of facts an Illinois court reached a contrary
result. A will devised property to the testator's children after the death of the
testator's wife, with a proviso that if either of the children predeceased the wife,
the share of such deceased child should go to his "children." This court held that
the word "children" included an adopted child. Munie v. Gruenewald, 289 Ill. 468,
124 N.E. 605 (1919 ). Other Illinois courts have held that an adopted child is as
much the child of the parent as though it had been a natural child. Sayles v.
Christie, 187 Ill. 420, 58 N.E. 480 (1900); Flannigan v. Howard, 200 Ill. 396,
65 N.E. 782, 59 L.R.A. 664, 93 Am. St. Rep. 201 (1902). In a case involving a set
of facts similar to the facts of the instant case, where a testator devised property
to his child and then over to the "child or children" of that child, it was held that
an adopted child did not take as a beneficiary. In re Woodcock, 103 Me. 214, 68
Atl. 821, 125 Am. St. Rep. 291 (1907). The Connecticut courts seem to have resolved the question by following the paramount rule of testamentary interpretation. Connecticut courts hold that "children," when used in a will, may include
adopted as well as natural children and the meaning of the word "children" is
wholly a question of the intent of the testator. Middletown Trust Co. v. Gaffey,
96 Conn. 61, 112 Atl. 689 (1921).
It is unnecessary to cite authority to substantiate the principle that in construing a will the controlling factor is the intent of the testator. In the case of
Finlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. 346, 7 L. Ed. 701 (1830), Chief Justice Marshall
said: "The intent of the testator is the cardinal rule in the construction of wills,
and if that intent can be clearly perceived, and is not contrary to some positive
rule of law, it must prevail, although in giving effect to it some words should be
rejected, or so restrained in their application as materially to change the literal
meaning of the particular sentence." This statement by Marshall was quoted with
approval in Whitcomb v. Rodman, 156 Ill. 116, 40 N.E. 553, 28 L.R.A. 149, 47
Am. St. Rep. 181 (1895). Some legal scholars have ventured the opinion that
when a court attempts to determine the "intent of the testator" that court is
merely presenting a type of illusory reasoning incapable of logical proof of valid
argument. The method of arriving at the intent of the testator has been summed
up neatly by a New York court. That court said: "It must be apparent . . .that
the art of testamentary interpretation is very far from an exact science and that
the particular result attained in a given case will largely be determined by the
individual predilections or prejudices of the particular perplexed judicial officer
who may be called upon to pass judgment on the question. This, in turn, like
other human expressions of opinion, will, no doubt, be influenced on occasion by
his immediately preceding postprandial activities and his matitudinal repast."
In re Montgomery's Estate, supra.
In the instant case the court determined the intent of the testator largely by
reference to the statute pertaining to adopted children. This statute provided in
part: "To all other persons [other than 'the adoptive parents] the adopted child
shall stand as if no such act of adoption had been taken." Ga. Laws, 1941, p. 305,
306; GA. CODE ANN. § 74-414 (1947 Supp.) On the basis of this provision alone,
the decision of the court was probably correct.
However, in the future, this question will not arise to harass any particular
perplexed judicial officer. By legislative enactment, approved February 25, 1949,
the General Assembly amended the statute pertaining to adopted children. Ga.
Laws, 1949, p. 1157. As amended, the provision reading "To all other persons
the adopted child shall stand as if no such act of adoption had been taken" was
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stricken and the following provision inserted: "From and after the enactment of
said Code Section (Acts, 1941, p. 305) said adopted child shall be considered in
all respects as if it were a child of natural bodily issue of petitioner or petitioners,
and shall enjoy every right and privilege of a natural child of petitioner or petitioners; and shall be deemed a natural child of petitioner or petitioners to inherit under the laws of descent and distribution in the absence of a will and to
take under the provisions of any instrument of testamentary gift, bequest, devise
or legacy unless expressly excluded therefrom." Therefore, by legislative enactment, the phrase "children of the children" includes an adopted as well as a
natural child, unless express words in a will indicate otherwise.
ROBERT E. COLL.

WILLS-CONFLICT OF LAWS-PASSING TITLE TO REALTY
A resident of Illinois who owned land in Iowa executed a will disposing of all
her property and subsequently wrote the word "void" across the face of the
instrument in at least five places, including the attestation clause, and across the
cover and envelope containing the will. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that
the will was revoked. The will was subsequently refused probate in Iowa. On
appeal, Held: Reversed. The Illinois judgment was not res judicata as to probate
proceedings in Iowa, and the attempted revocation was ineffective in Iowa. The
will was entitled to probate with respect to land in Iowa. In re Barrie's Estate,
35 N.W. 2d 658 (Iowa 1949).
In countries following the common law jurisprudence, title to land passes only
by the lex rei sitae. Vo gel v. New York Life Insurance Co., 55 F. 2d 205 (C.C.A.
5th 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 604, 53 S. Ct. 9, 77 L. Ed. 525 (1932). To be a
muniment of title to land, a will must be executed afid proven according to the
law where the land lies, and probate in another jurisdiction is not binding unless
given effect by the local law. Darby v. Mayer, 10 Wheat. 465, 6 L. Ed. 367 (1825).
Generally, the law of the situs not only governs the descent, alienation and transfer of land but also controls the effect and construction of wills and -other conveyances affecting real estate. Greenwood v. Page, 138 F. 2d 921, 78 App. D.C.
161 (1943).

The judgment of a court probating a will is binding upon all persons interested
in the property to be.-administered under the will, and a foreign decree establishing the fact of testacy has been held to be conclusive of the matter in another
state by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.
Crippen v. Dexter, 13 Gray 330 (Mass. 1859). A judgment in rem binds only
the property within jurisdiction of the court rendering it. Thorman v. Frame, 176
U.S. 350, 20 S. Ct. 446, 44 L. Ed. 500 (1900).. The rule that rights in realty are
to be determined according to the law of the situs prevents giving conclusive
effect, so far as concerns real estate within the state, to an adjudication by a
f3reign Court denying probate of an instrument. Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517,
198 So. 215, 131 A.L.R. 1038 (1940). The United States Supreme Court has left
each state free to assert its full power over local property in disregard of foreign
probate judgments. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186, 20 S. Ct. 606, 44 L. Ed. 1028
(1900).

Some statutes provide that an authenticated copy of a will and of its foreign
probate may be admitted to probate in the state if the will has been executed in
accordance with the law of the decedent's domicile, Epperson v. Buck Inv. Co.,
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176 Tenn. 358, 141 S.W. 2d 887 (1940), while others hold that the original will
may be probated in "this" state if it is executed according to the law of decedent's
domicile and may pass title to any estate. Appeal of Murdock, 81 Conn. 681, 72
Atl. 290, 129 Am. St. Rep. 231 (1909). Some states require that a will devising
realty must be executed according to its own laws before an authenticated copy
of the foreign probate will be admitted to probate in order to pass title to land
in that state. Clayson v. Clayson, 24 Ore. 542, 34 Pac. 358 (1893). The function
of a statute, which in effect allows the authenticated copy of a will and its record
of probate at the domicile of the decedent to prove the will, and gives such proof
the same effect as if the will was originally probated within the jurisdiction
enacting such a statute, is to eliminate the necessity of producing the original
will, and not to dispense with the necessity that a will affecting real estate must
be executed according to the laws of the state before it or its authenticated copy
can be admitted to probate in that state. White v. Greenway, 330 Mo. 691, 263 S.W.
104 (1924).
A will can be admitted to probate in a competent court of any jurisdiction in
which an administrator could have been appointed had the decedent died intestate. McPherson v. McKay, 205 Ark. 1135, 172 S.W. 2d 911 (1943). However,
admission to probate in the state of decedent's domicile is not a condition precedent to admission to probate in another state. In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo.
181, 97 P. 2d 677 (1940). Some courts have no jurisdiction to probate the will
of a non-resident except as ancilliary to a probate by the court of the testator's
domicile. In re Chadwick's Will, 80 N.J. Eq. 471, 85 Atl. 266 (Ct. Err. & App.
1912).
All wills executed in another state and witnessed according to the laws of that
state, and which are probated in that state, constitute muniments of title to
realty without being probated in Georgia when they are accompanied by an exemplification of the record admitting the will to probate in another state. GA.
CODE ANN. § 113-709 (1947 Supp.). However, if an administration of the estate
is necessary the will must be probated in Georgia. League v. Churchill, 164 Ga.
36, 137 S.E. 632 (1927). Georgia would probably follow the immediate case
since any will executed and witnessed according to the laws of Georgia may be
probated in Georgia. GA. CODE § 113-702 (1933). The validity of a foreign probate
judgment seems to be in the discretion of the particular state.
MARVIN M. DEAN.

WILLS-RIGHT OF PROBATE COURT TO RENOUNCE WILL
ON BEHALF OF INSANE WIDOW
Testator's will was admitted to probate. Subsequently, his widow was declared
incompetent by the court and a conservator was appointed over her estate and
person. The conservator filed an ex parte petition asking for an order directing
him to renounce the will in behalf of his ward. The executor and the testhtor's
niece, who was also a devisee under the will, contested the jurisdiction of the
court to make such an order. The probate court allowed the renunciation to be
filed. On appeal, Held: Affirmed. The probate court in Illinois has equitable
jurisdiction over the estate of incompetent wards, and may order on behalf of
and in the name of the ward a renunciation of the will. Smith-Hurd Ann. St. Ch.
3, § 202 (1948 Supp.). In re Reighard's Estate, 402 Ill. 364, 84 N.E. 2d 345 (1949).
Renunciation by the widow is a rejection of the testamentary provisions made
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for her and, in effect, they are obliterated from the will. The remaining provisions of the instrument are not destroyed but remain operative upon the property not included within the share of the spouse. Sueske v. Schofield, 376 Ill.
431, 34 N.E. 2d 399 (1941). In some jurisdictions express statutory enactments
govern the right of election on behalf of an incompetent beneficiary for or against
a will. Ambrose v. Rugg, 123 Ohio St. 433, 175 N.E. 691, 74 A.L.R. 449 (1931).
The manifest intent of statutes allowing an election to be filed was to promote
certainty in the settlement of estates. McCutcheon's Estate, 283 Pa. 157, 128
Atl. 843 (1925). It has been held on many occasions that the right of election is
personal. McClintock's Estate, 240 Pa. 543, 87 Atl. 703 (1913). It is a personal
right as distinguished from a property right and not necessarily a right to be
exercised only by direct personal action. Celenza's Estate, 308 Pa. 186, 162 Atl.
456 (1932). Although the right of election is held to be personal to the testamentary beneficiary in the event that he has some inconsistent claim against the
testator's estate, it is subject to certain well-defined qualifications, one being the
right of a court of competent jurisdiction to elect in behalf of a beneficiary who
is mentally incompetent. Celenza's Estate, supra. Contra: Clark v. Boston Safe
Deposit & Trust Co., 116 Me. 450, 102 Atl. 289 (1917). (Neither guardian nor
court can elect for an insane widow.) A court of chancery has general jurisdiction, upon the filing of a petition by a conservator, to order and direct the
conservator to renounce testamentary provisions made for an incompetent. German Evangelical Orphan's Home v. Seago, 155 Il. App. 76 (1910). On the other
hand, probate or surrogate courts have no such inherent jurisdiction unless the
court has been conferred general equitable jurisdiction or granted the specific
right. Andrews v. Bassett, 92 Mich. 449, 52 N.W. 743, 17 A.L.R. 296 (1892).
Georgia courts which exercise broad equitable jurisdiction have express statutory authorization to make an election on behalf of an incompetent legatee. GA.
CODE ANN. § 37-503; see also ibid, §§ 37-501, 37-502, 113-819. Election has
been made on behalf of infants, Swann v. Garrett, 71 Ga. 566 (1883); Hilton
v. Sherman, 155 Ga. 624, 630, 118 S.E. 356 (1923), and may be order for
any incompetent ward, in general. Foster v. Allen, 201 Ga. 348, 40 S.E. 2d 57
(1946). Courts of ordinary act as probate courts in Georgia, and are given jurisdiction, among other things, over matters relating to estates of deceased persons, and to idiots, lunatics, and insane persons, including the sale of a testator's
property. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1901 (4) (10). An early Supreme Court decision, in applying these provisions, recognized that the court of ordinary has
been granted chancery powers to the extent of ordering sale and other disposition of the estates of deceased persons. Welborn v. Rogers, 24 Ga. 558
(1857) (citing Ga. Laws, 1829, p. 36). This seemingly innocuous statement is
perhaps misleading in the abbreviated fashion in which it is cited by the code
annotators: "Act of 1829 gave court of ordinary all powers of court of chancery."
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1901 (4) note. Clearly the 1829 Act and the early case
refer only to the court's power of disposing of testator's property. In the
instant case, the majority court construed the Illinois statutes as conferring
the right of making an election for an incompetent legatee upon the probate
courts. Their counterparts in Georgia, the courts of ordinary, have no general
equitable jurisdiction, however. The superior courts must handle such matters in
Georgia.
FRANK H. BASS, JR.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURIES RESULTING FROM
EMPLOYEE'S CURIOSITY
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant company, left the room where he customarily performed his duties and entered an adjacent room in' which, on occasions,
a part of his work was done. His solepurpose in going into the latter room was
to satisfy his curiosity as to the suction power of a recently installed windowfan. As a consequence of examining the fan, he suffered injuries when his hand
was drawn into it. The trial court allowed the plaintiff's claim for workmen's
compensation. On appeal, Held: Reversed. Injuries sustained by an employee as
a result of curiosity are not compensable as "arising out of and in the course of
employment." Simon v. Standard Oil Co., 36 N.W. 2d 102 (Neb. 1949).
Workmen's Compensation Acts provide for compensation where an injury
arises out of and in the course of the employment. Although the courts will not
allow recovery where there has been wilful misconduct, they have laid down a
very broad test for all other cases: an injurly is compensable if it arises out of
the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the employment. Caswell's Case,
305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E. 2d 328 (1940). The difficulty occurs in applying the
rule, i.e., in determining whether or not the act of the employee is incident to the
employment. In deciding "curiosity" and similar cases, the courts have formulated
two distinct theories. Under the old theory, based on common law concepts of
tort liability and a narrow interpretation of the scope and purpose of Compensation statutes, acts of curiosity are-held not incident to the employment. Cennell
v. Oscar Daniels Co., 203 Mich. 73, 168 N.W. 1009, 7 A.L.R. 1301 (1918) (watching unloading of wagon); Maronofsky's Case, 234 Mass. 343, 125 N.E. 565 (1920)
(attempting to ascertain contents of vat) ;Saucier's Case, 122 Me. 325, 119 Atl.
860 (1923) (putting hand into exhaust fan) ; Sullivan's Case, 128 Me. 353, 147
Atl. 431 (1929) (inserting hand into fellow-employee's machine); Peterman v.
Industrial Commission, 228 Wis. 352, 280 N.W. 379 (1938) (grabbing unguarded
shaft of machine). In the past two decades, however, there has been a decided
trend ,away from such an inflexible rule and toward a more liberal construction of
Compensation acts. This trend was first discernible in the "horseplay" cases,
in which injured employees were allowed to recover on the theory that since
their work brought them into close association, horseplay was within the reasonable contemplation of the employment and thus an incident thereof. Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F. 2d 11, 17 (App. D.C. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649. The rationale of the modern view is that industrial accidents,
whether or not due to the fault of the worker, are a hazard of the business and
should be borne not by the individual worker but by the industry in which he is engaged. Wheeling Corrugating Co. v. MeManigal, 41 F. 2d 593 (C.C.A. 4th 1930).
The majority of the courts now hold that any act within the reasonable contemplation of the employment is incident thereto, Bradford's Case, 319 Mass. 621, 67 N.E.
2d 149 (1946), and resolve doubtful cases, in view of the beneficent purpose of the
legislation, in favor of the injured employee. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 195 P. 2d 919 (Cal. 1948). Acts of personal curiosity
are held to be within the scope of this rule. Derby v. International Salt Co.,
233 App. Div. 15, 251 N.Y. Supp. 531 (3rd Dep't 1931) (examining box containing dynamite); Bernier v. Greenville Mills, 93 N.H. 165, 37 A. (2d) 5 (1944)
(putting hand into fellow-employee's machine); Franck v. Allen, 270 App. Div.
960, 61 N.Y.S. 2d 728 (3rd Dep't 1946) (prodding dynamite cap with nail);
Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Parker, 64 F. Supp. 615 (D. Md. 1946) (extending head
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into dumbwaiter panel). In the Bernier case, supra, where the claimant was injured in attempting "to see what made the cloth stand up," the court held that
his curiosity was something that might reasonably be expected under the circumstances.
The avowed purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Acts is to shift to industry the burden of los suffered by employees whenever such loss results from
an act "arising out of and in the course of the employment." The liberal majority of the courts, in interpreting the above phrase, holds compensable all injuries flowing from acts in which an employee might reasonably be expected to
indulge. It is submitted that the act of the plaintiff here fall s within this category.
His curiosity as to the effectiveness of a fan recently installed was natural and
was such an occurrence as an employer might reasonably have anticipated. The
Nebraska court, in denying recovery, aligns itself with the minority view which
tends to unduly restrict compensation legislation.
JuLE B. GREENE.

